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 Strategically determining organizational boundaries is one means to achieving better 
performance. This dissertation examines vertical integration, strategic acquisitions and concurrent 
sourcing to better understand the strategies used to acquire human capital and the impacts of these 
choices on performance outcomes. Using transaction cost economics and the organizational capabilities 
literatures I develop hypotheses to determine and explain the relevant antecedents to these strategic 
decisions. I then determine how the decision to make or buy (or both) human capital impacts 
competitive advantage and how competitive advantage impacts financial outcomes (i.e., revenue, and 
sales). Hypotheses are tested using data on 30 organizations from Major League Baseball (as well as 
their subsidiaries) spanning from 2002-2011. Regression models are used to identify significant 







CHAPTER 1: THE DISSERTATION TOPIC 
Introduction 
 Identifying the boundaries of organizations is a storied topic in strategic management (e.g., 
Chandler, 1977; Coase, 1937; Thompson, 1967; Williamson, 1975). The boundary of an organization is 
very important as organizations choose what businesses to be in and the extent of their involvement. 
While this has been an ongoing question, scholars struggle to explain how organizations make these 
determinations (Parmigiani, 2007). To provide some insights into these decisions, I seek to answer the 
following questions: What factors affect organizations’ decisions to source their human capital (i.e., 
Study 1)? How do these decisions impact competitive advantage and does competitive advantage 
mediate the relationship between sourcing decisions and financial outcomes (i.e., Study 2)?  
 In regards to the first of these two questions, organizations must make strategic decisions about 
where to draw boundaries and how much of the value chain to control. Broadly, there are two sides to 
this coin, (1) to determine these decisions in synergetic ways in order to add value and (2) to determine 
these decisions to reduce costs. Regarding the former, scholars argue that organizations should 
concentrate on core competencies and contract with the market (i.e., buy) for  inputs which they do not 
have a competitive advantage in producing (e.g., Barney, 1991) or that cannot lead to advanced and 
sustainable capabilities, an important construct to determining organizational boundaries (Madhok, 
1996). If an organization can add value by producing internally it should do so, but if not, it should buy 
the input in the market. Others point out that contracts are expensive, and that other organizations act 
opportunistically and in unexpected, uncertain ways (e.g., Williamson, 1981). Thus, when organizations 
(1) need very specific assets (i.e., non-redeployable investments), (2) in uncertain environments, and (3) 






Of course these different approaches have some interplay (see Geyskens et al, 2006). While it 
can be strategic to primarily make or to buy, a single approach may lead to the too-much-of-a-good-
thing (TMGT) effect; complete vertical integration depends too heavily on organizational capabilities, 
while completely acquiring has control problems and high information and coordination costs which put 
organizations at risk for opportunistic behaviors. Because vertical integration limits options, and 
strategic acquisitions at high levels diminish the ability to recognize opportunism, too much of either 
may eventually lead to diminishing returns (or even negative impacts). Therefore, organizations may 
choose to both make and buy, a practice termed concurrent sourcing (e.g., Parmigiani, 2007; Parmigiani 
& Mitchell, 2009), also referred to as tapered integration (e.g., Harrigan, 1986; Rothaermel, Hitt, & 
Jobe, 2006) and plural governance (e.g., Hennert, 1993; Puranam, Gulati, & Bhattacharya, 2013). The 
idea that there is an optimal sourcing decision and that the decision can vary across organizations is also 
captured in literature examining the alignment of organizational actions with characteristics of, and 
conditions affecting, an organization. As is presumed by the TMGT effect, misalignment is thought to 
negatively affect organizational performance. 
 Major League Baseball (MLB) is a unique context for the sourcing decision. All 30 MLB teams 
have programs in which they develop their players’ skill sets (i.e., minor leagues). If a player performs 
well within the developmental system, he may be promoted through various developmental stages and 
eventually make it on an organization’s professional roster. A professional roster of an MLB team 
consists of 25 players, some of whom may come from an organization’s internal developmental system. 
Players who are not a product of the team’s development system are acquired in the marketplace, either 
through free agency or via trades. The interesting question is what determines how many players on a 
professional roster come from a team’s developmental program and how many are developed by other 





continue to study how, why, and when organizations use internal or external labor (Bidwell & Keller, 
2013), issues this context helps us understand. The sourcing decision is a common issue for MLB teams 
as it is for other business organizations. Just as business organizations have accountants, sales 
representatives and so forth, MLB teams have positions requiring various specialized skills, such as 
pitchers, infielders, catchers, et cetera. All MLB teams must consider the extent to which they will 
develop players internally (some who will become talented members of the organization, and some who 
will not), or seek talent from other teams. Regarding the former, moving players with potential to the 
professional roster is similar to promoting talented employees up the corporate ladder in a business 
organization. Likewise, when MLB teams have needs for talented players, but do not have the internal 
talent to fill those needs, they may acquire players from other teams. Talent acquisitions can come from 
close industry competitors (i.e., intradivision rivals in a MLB setting) or from any organization that 
equips players with the desired skill sets, including international leagues. Furthermore, organizations 
that acquire talent in the marketplace also potentially diminish the performance of competitors through 
human capital loss (Shaw, Park, & Kim, 2013).   
 In the case of MLB, and in accordance with the resource based view (RBV) of the firm, teams 
have varying resources. Some teams may have more capital (i.e., wealth in the form of money or assets); 
some may have better developmental programs; and some may have both or neither asset. Accordingly, 
these resources are capabilities which impact organizational competitive advantage. Regarding the three 
fundamental mechanisms of transaction cost economics (TCE) (i.e., asset specificity, uncertainty, and 
frequency), asset specificity is low (i.e., the skills employees possess readily transfer to other 
organizations), uncertainty varies among players (i.e., it’s unknown whether employees will continue to 
perform but even less known is an organization’s ability to develop employees), and frequency varies 





acquisition of human capital as well as the subsequent impact of this strategic decision on various 
performance outcomes.  
 MLB allows me to explore performance outcomes in various ways. Throughout the past two 
decades a greater emphasis has been given to multiple performance measures such as the triple bottom 
line, the balanced scorecard, competitive advantage, stakeholder performance, varying financials 
outcomes, and so forth (e.g., Berman, Wicks, Kotha, & Jones, 1999; Brower & Mahajan, 2012; 
Clarkson, 1995). Within MLB, I analyze three performance outcomes. Specifically, I determine how 
sourcing impacts competitive advantage (i.e., one type of performance outcome) and then also how 
competitive advantage impacts revenue and sales (i.e., two other performance outcomes). This not only 
helps nail down whether sourcing impacts competitive advantage but also sheds light on the ensuing 
impact on separate financial outcomes. In doing so, I measure competitive advantage through team wins 
to assess whether the sourcing of human capital impacts this performance outcome. Subsequently, I 
determine whether competitive advantage impacts financial performance outcomes of MLB team 
revenue (i.e., the incoming dollar amount), and sales through ballpark attendance. These are appropriate 
performance measures for MLB and also align my two stage performance analysis with the theoretical 
framework. By providing multiple and varying outcomes rather than one measure for financial 
performance, I can deduce generalizable conclusions relevant to MLB that also apply to other business 
organizations.  
Contribution of the Dissertation 
 Vertical integration is a well-developed topic that continues to receive attention in the literature 
(e.g., Zhang, 2013). More recent topics such as concurrent sourcing are embedded within vertical 
integration and also maintain relevance in top strategy journals (e.g., Heide, Kumar, & Wathne, 2013; 





al, 2013). I will utilize literature on vertical integration and concurrent sourcing to unpack vertical 
integration, strategic acquisitions, and concurrent sourcing and explain how these prominent topics in 
strategic management relate and apply to human capital. I will identify the impacts of various levels of 
concurrent sourcing rather than treating this as a dichotomous phenomenon. This differentiation will 
help to better explain how varying levels of concurrent sourcing impact various outcomes. I also test 
concurrent sourcing through human capital which may shed light on differences between human capital 
and other more traditionally tested inputs in the value chain (e.g., products, raw materials). The context 
which I examine, MLB, allows me to further explore organizations’ sourcing decisions in unique (e.g., 
human capital and competitive advantage) yet generalizable ways.  
 Next, TCE has been fundamental to vertical integration, but relatively silent about concurrent 
sourcing. As a prominent mid-range theory, TCE should be useful in explaining concurrent sourcing. I 
will demonstrate the utility of TCE to understanding concurrent sourcing, extending the application of 
this theoretical framework. Further, the TCE literature has not given enough attention to frequency (i.e., 
the third leg of the transaction cost “stool”), an aspect necessary to better ground research using TCE. 
Therefore further explanations of the frequency leg will incrementally contribute to TCE theory. Finally, 
by designing hypotheses between the organizational capabilities and TCE literatures (e.g., Parmigiani, 
2007), I address the utility of each as a theoretical perspective to explain varying degrees of concurrent 
sourcing human capital. 
 In addition to identifying antecedents of the make versus buy decision in Study 1, I examine its 
impact on performance by analyzing two aspects of the strategy—performance relationship: 
organizational alignment and the TMGT effect (i.e., Study 2). I address organizational alignment 
between predicted concurrent sourcing and actual concurrent sourcing to provide evidence as to whether 






TMGT effect which is fairly well studied in certain areas of strategy (e.g., diversification), however 
vertical integration and strategic acquisitions have received less attention in the TMGT effect literature. 
I address this deficiency by showing that the make versus buy decision, specifically involving human 
capital, is impacted by the TMGT effect. These performance related contributions reveal the importance 
of considering multiple performance mechanisms less often explored in lieu of a single financial 
outcome. Namely, the results show how strategic concurrent sourcing impacts competitive advantage 
and how competitive advantage impacts financial outcomes. Further, although it can be difficult to 
precisely measure an organization’s value creating strategy (i.e., competitive advantage, Barney, 1991), 
MLB records a statistic for wins and losses which precisely measures a team’s competitive advantage. 
Thus, MLB provides an opportunity to demonstrate how the composition of an organization’s human 
capital impacts competitive advantage and how competitive advantage mediates the relationship 





























Definitions of Key Terms 
 Below are definitions for the terms that are critical to the dissertation. These include terminology 
important to the literature review, theory, and hypotheses sections: 
 Vertical Integration. Vertical integration “involves a variety of decisions concerning whether 
corporations, through their business units, should provide certain goods or services in-house or purchase 
them from outsiders instead” (Harrigan, 1985, p. 397).  
 Strategic Acquisitions. Strategic acquisitions are the governance mechanism that emerges when 
organizations rely on markets to provide specialized capabilities as a supplement to organizations’ 
existing competencies. (Holcomb & Hitt, 2007: 467-468). 
 Concurrent Sourcing. Concurrent sourcing “occurs when firms both make and buy some of their 
requirements for a component” (Parmigiani & Mitchell, 2009, p. 1066) “or simultaneously make and 
buy the same good” (Parmigiani, 2007, p. 285). 
 Transaction Cost Economics (TCE). “The transaction cost approach to the study of economic 
organization regards the transaction as the basic unit of analysis and holds that an understanding of 
transaction cost economizing is central to the study of organizations” (Williamson, 1981, p. 548). 
Organizations attempt to reduce transaction costs according to three fundamental elements: asset 
specificity, uncertainty, and frequency (Williamson, 1985).  
 Organizational Capabilities. Organizational capabilities “views the firm as a bundle of resources 
and capabilities linked together through firm-specific routines which can behave both as a competitive 
constraint as well as the source of sustainable value” (Madhok, 1996, p. 578). 
 Competitive Advantage. Competitive advantage is when an organization creates more value than 





 Organizational Alignment. Organizational alignment refers to how closely an organization’s 
actions agree with its predicted actions based on its internal characteristics and external influences. 
Deviations from predicted courses of action lead to misalignment.  
 Too-Much-Of-A-Good-Thing Effect. A meta-theoretical principle stating that most relationships 
resemble an inverted U such that predictor variables have a beneficial impact at first but cease to be 
positive beyond certain levels (Pierce & Aguinis, 2013: 315). 
Summary of the Remaining Chapters 
 In chapter two, prior literature on vertical integration, strategic acquisitions, concurrent sourcing, 
performance, organizational alignment, and the TMGT effect are reviewed to develop and explain 
antecedents to the sourcing decision (Study 1) and how the sourcing decision affects performance 
outcomes (Study 2). After reviewing the literature, I develop the theory and hypotheses in chapter three. 
This is followed by a description of the methods (chapter four) and results (chapter five). In chapter six, 





CHAPTER II: REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
Introduction 
 This chapter begins by addressing buyer-supplier relations. Following this positioning within the 
literature, I discuss vertical integration, strategic acquisitions, and concurrent sourcing as separate 
decisions while also addressing varying levels of concurrent sourcing. Then performance, organizational 
alignment and the TMGT effect literatures are reviewed. Finally, an overview of MLB is provided 
describing the developmental system for players on MLB teams and its applicability to sourcing human 
capital in strategic management. The objective of chapter two is to review the sourcing literature, 
demonstrate the need to better understand factors affecting make versus buy decisions, provide an 
overview of performance, why balance may be optimal, and how MLB is useful for these purposes.   
Buyer- Supplier Relations 
 Within the realm of corporate strategy, organizations must determine the foci of their business 
and how much of the vertical chain to control. Extending the value chain is an expansion of an 
organization’s business and is done for a variety of reasons including, but not limited to, risk mitigation, 
cost reduction, synergies, managerial decisions, and exploitation of economies of scope (Ansoff, 1957; 
Ramanujam & Varadarajan, 1989). Regardless of the reasons, the most widely analyzed determinant of 
value chain boundaries is its impact on performance (Chatterjee & Wernerfelt, 1991). This research 
dates back to the early works of Rumelt (1974; 1982) and has been a topic of great interest since the mid 
1900’s when U.S. organizations dramatically expanded their boundaries (Rumelt, 1982).  
  In the case of buyer-supplier relations, organizations may choose to engage with suppliers or 
expand existing value chains by developing internally (i.e., backward integration). Research has focused 
on various issues in the buyer-supplier domain such as governing relations (Liu, Luo, & Liu, 2009), 
understanding trade-offs (Hoetker, 2005), antecedents and consequences of opportunism (Hawkins, 





delivery systems (Imrie & Morris, 1992). Other issues also receiving attention include just-in-time 
manufacturing, minimum inventory programs, effectiveness of purchasing, and sourcing decisions 
(Turnbull, Oliver, & Wilkinson, 1992). Although many aspects of buyer-supplier relations are outside 
the scope of this dissertation, I focus on key aspects of this relationship. Namely, do single value chains 
source through the buyer-supplier relationship, internal processes, or both? 
 Hence, the first emphasis (i.e., Study 1) of my work examines the sourcing decision as it pertains 
to backward integration. Organizations must determine which aspects of their business they will make 
internally and which they will buy on the market through various buyer-supplier relations. Beginning 
with an overview of buyer-supplier relations helps demonstrate how the present study is embedded in a 
rich literature stream. By reviewing this literature I can see how these sourcing decisions are often made 
through economizing on transaction costs and building synergies from organizational capabilities. 
Furthermore, concurrent sourcing, as discussed more thoroughly in the coming pages, may allow 
organizations to balance all of the above by reducing transaction costs and enhancing synergies that are 
associated with a balanced strategy of making and buying. The following subsections highlight three 
different organizational choices when acquiring necessary inputs: to vertically integrate, strategically 
acquire, or concurrently source.  
Vertical Integration: The Decision to “Make” 
 Vertical integration is an aspect of organizing by which organizations conduct more of the value 
chain internally. Research on vertical integration has remained prominent since the 1930s when Coase 
(1937) ignited streams of research by asking a simple but powerful question: If markets are efficient, 
what purposes do organizations serve? Though prominent in strategic management, this topic is also 
important to other disciplines. For example, operations management scholars study the supply chain and 





Zacharia, 2001). These examples relate to where a value chain should start and where it should end, 
respectively.  
 Vertical integration may occur through backward integration which addresses the supplier side of 
a single value chain “where the firm takes over ownership and control of producing its own components 
or other inputs” (Grant, 2008, p. 344). Backward integration (also known as upstream) is the focal side 
of sourcing decisions at the core of this study. Alternatively, forward integration (also known as 
downstream) is control over the post-production process all the way to the customer. Together the line 
of activities related to one product or service is termed the value chain. Organizations make decisions 
about how much of this chain to control, related to economies of scope and scale along the value chain. 
With products, for example, this involves all steps from extracting raw materials to placing a finished 
good into a customer’s hands. Organizations which control more of these steps (i.e., between raw 
materials and purchases) are considered to be more vertically integrated (Barney & Hesterly, 2012). 
Historically this work has focused on production. However, a limited number of studies have begun to 
address how and why this is important for human capital and how organizations can develop their 
employees to enhance organizational performance (e.g., Saks & Haccoun, 2010). For example, Lepak 
and Snell (1999) design a framework based on the uniqueness and value of human capital and determine 
employment mode, employment relationship, and HR configurations. They propose organizations’ can 
gain competitive advantage by internally developing highly unique, highly valuable employees.  
 As with most strategic decisions, vertical integration has benefits and costs. Harrigan (1984) 
identified two forms of benefits: internal benefits (e.g., integration economies, improved coordination, 
and time savings by avoiding interactions with suppliers) and competitive benefits (e.g., improve 
intelligence, opportunity to create differentiation, control, and synergies). Other benefits include 





protection and control over assets and services, access to new forms of technology, and simplified 
procurement associated with reducing the number of suppliers to an organization (Balakrishnan & 
Wernerfelt, 1986; Carter, 1977; Coase, 1937; Harrigan, 1984; Ketchen, Eisner, Dess, & Lumpkin, 2009; 
Klein, Crawford, & Alchian; 1978) Despite the advantages to vertically integrating, there are also 
disadvantages. 
 While vertical integration gives the organization procurement simplicities, administrative and 
coordination costs must be considered (Zhou, 2011). If coordination costs outweigh the benefits of 
vertical integration, expanding the value chain should be avoided. Other internal disadvantages include 
excess capacity and poor organization (Harrigan, 1984). Competitively, organizations may get stuck 
with obsolete processes (i.e., loss of flexibility), lose information from suppliers or even exaggerate the 
suggested synergies (Harrigan, 1984). There are also costs of additional facilities, equipment, and so 
forth. Finally, even if vertically integrated organizations are more flexible by coordinating inputs while 
avoiding holdup costs (Coase, 1937; Klein, 1988), highly integrated organizations can lack flexibility 
and adaptability because of high switching costs (Monteverde & Teece, 1982), and more challenges to 
change through  learning in stable environments (Sorenson, 2003).  
Many of the above advantages and disadvantages have been studied for production but there are 
differences for human capital. For example, humans have the potential to behave in very unpredictable 
ways such as choosing to resign from a company immediately after receiving training; yet unlike most 
machines, humans can provide verbal feedback about the training they receive to expedite the specific 
development process, thereby adding value to the organization due to the decision to vertically integrate. 
Only when managers are mindful of both the advantages and disadvantages can vertical integration be a 






Strategic Acquisitions: The Decision to “Buy” 
 Organizations that are not vertically integrated instead choose to acquire from others (e.g., 
allowing other organizations to train and develop human capital). Strategic outsourcing is “the 
organizing arrangement that emerges when firms rely on intermediate markets to provide specialized 
capabilities that supplement existing capabilities deployed along a firm’s value chain” (Holcomb & Hitt, 
2007, pp. 467-468). However, because outsourcing commonly implies that an organization no longer 
conducts a function that was previously completed internally, the semantics as applied to this context are 
not quite precise. In the context of human capital, the purchased “product” from the market is not 
perishable in the same way a component might be. Rather, the human capital asset remains in the 
organization. Thus there is some difficulty in choosing the most appropriate term. However, henceforth I 
refer to the process of acquiring human capital from other organizations as strategic acquisitions. Rather 
than produce the necessary inputs (e.g., labor, products) themselves, these organizations acquire them 
from others. This allows organizations to be more modular, conducting activities they do best, avoiding 
unnecessary coordination costs for activities that will not lead to greater synergies, and also giving 
organizations access to talent and opportunities to learn. There are, of course, downsides to acquiring, 
such as lengthy contracts, losing touch with supplier innovation, and so forth. While allowing others to 
develop human capital exploded in popularity during the 1980s, some organizations find advantages to 
bringing activities back in house (McLaughlin & Peppard, 2006) due to the discovery of hidden costs 
and complexities associated with outsourcing (Reitzig & Wagner, 2010). 
 Acquiring human capital is relevant to a whole host of organizational functions including human 
resources, enterprise resource planning systems, financial, production, inventory, analytics, and 
customer service (Laplante, Costello, Singh, Bindiganavile, & Landon, 2004). Acquiring rather than 





advancements which made it easier to conduct business offsite. Oddly, acquiring has received limited 
coverage in strategic management (e.g., Holcomb & Hitt, 2007; Quinn & Hilmer, 1994; Rothaermel et 
al, 2006).  
 Like the present study, other prominent research has related this important organization 
boundary decision to two fundamental theories, TCE and organizational capabilities (Holcomb & Hitt, 
2007). TCE focuses on efficiency and economizing on exchanges through contracts and primary 
mechanisms (i.e., asset specificity, uncertainty, and frequency), and organizational capabilities promotes 
acquiring human capital if outside of its core competencies (i.e., does not provide synergy or sustainable 
competitive advantage). Thus, organizational capabilities allow organizations to focus on core 
competencies yet still provide two fundamental guidelines to best achieve strategic acquisitions: 
resource-picking (i.e., managers outsmart the resource market) and capability-building (i.e., managers 
design systems to elevate the selected resources) (Holcomb & Hitt, 2007; Makadok, 2001).  
 As organizations continue to seek voluntary arrangements to exchange in the market 
(Rothaermel et al, 2006), acquiring talent will remain a viable option. In this study, which focuses on 
human talent, MLB teams face difficult decisions when acquiring human capital because, despite their 
best efforts to draft optimal contracts, not all information can be uncovered ex ante. Furthermore, 
although most acquisition literature applies to human capital, not all of the costs and benefits apply. For 
example, learning from suppliers has limited value in MLB. Additionally, although teams may attempt 
to do so, they cannot completely predict future needs. Therefore, in cases where human capital 
development may not be ready, acquiring is a reasonable alternative because of its immediate impact in 
times of urgent need. However, because vertical integration and strategic acquisitions have costs and 






Concurrent Sourcing: The Decision to “Make” and “Buy” 
 Concurrent sourcing is the process by which organizations both make (i.e., vertically integration) 
and buy (i.e., strategically acquire) necessary inputs (Parmigiani, 2007). This is also known as tapered 
integration, “when firms are backward or forward integrated but rely on outsiders for a portion of their 
supplies or distribution” (Harrigan, 1984, p. 643). Organizations do this to stay knowledgeable about 
inputs they are purchasing which avoids other organizations acting opportunistically (i.e., taking 
advantage of an organizations lack of knowledge), an issue that links capabilities (i.e., knowledge) and 
transaction costs (i.e., opportunism). Moreover, because concurrent sourcing allows organizations to 
acquire resources from the market, rarely will the buyer be put in undesirable situations due to dire need 
(Adleman, 1949). Additionally, organizations can control and supplement their needs flexibly and with 
the greatest reduction of performance uncertainty (Mols, 2010), which is especially important 
considering the behavioral uncertainty of human capital. Hence in the case of MLB, teams can 
supplement their rosters with successfully trained players or strategically acquired players as necessary. 
 Organizations consider a host of questions when deciding whether to vertically integrate or 
strategically acquire, a rigorous calculus weighing costs and benefits. Research often implies 
organizations must either make or buy, and neglects the fact that organizations can both make and buy at 
the same time. A blend of both allows organizations to integrate knowledge back to their internal 
operations (He & Nickerson, 2006; Parmigiani & Mitchell, 2009). Having this internal process provides 
organizations with absorptive capacity to acquire knowledge from similarly focused suppliers (Cohen & 
Levinthal, 1990). In the case of human capital, this gives organizations the know-how to develop talent 
and also to assess and refine acquired talent. Scholars focused on the sourcing issue as early as the 1940s 
(Adleman, 1949), but more intensely since the 1980s (Harrigan, 1984; 1985). Yet we still see 





Parmigiani, 2007; Parmigiani & Mitchell, 2009; Rothaermel et al, 2006). I contribute to this literature by 
demonstrating how concurrent sourcing affects an organization’s competitive advantage via 
organizational alignment and the TMGT effect. In addition, I examine the importance of organizational 
alignment and the TMGT effect associated with concurrent sourcing’s impact on financial performance 
through competitive advantage.   
Organizational Performance 
 Certain advantages of concurrent sourcing are expected to enhance performance because 
concurrent sourcing allows firms to balance TCE and organizational capabilities perspectives. Adelman 
(1949) points out that organizations will rarely overproduce inventory because they can rely on the 
market for additional supplies if needed and hence obtain all possible sales by avoiding inventory stock 
outs. This allows organizations to produce their supplies internally at optimal efficiency levels rather 
than acquire additional production or service equipment that may sit idle at times. Because concurrent 
sourcing permits learning (Adelman, 1949), performance is also enhanced by improving quality and 
cutting costs based on new and learned knowledge. Other benefits of concurrent sourcing have been 
highlighted in prior sections such as gained information, reduction of vulnerability to shortages (Bradach 
& Eccles, 1989), reduction of information asymmetry (Heide, 2003), monitoring of R&D, and enhanced 
bargaining power (Harrigan, 1984) but these benefits are often only implicitly connected to 
performance. Through the use of MLB data, multiple performance outcomes are tested to determine 
whether roster composition has an impact.  
 Much of the extant research assumes because organizations pursue concurrent sourcing, it 
ultimately helps them perform better or survive longer. However, as Parmigiani (2007) notes, 
organizational economics theories, in which much of the make, buy, or concurrently sourcing literature 





argues “that concurrent sourcing improves performance when firms face a combination of volume 
uncertainty, technological uncertainty, performance uncertainty, non-decomposability, transaction-
specific investments, and strong internal and external capabilities.” This demonstrates how concurrent 
sourcing integrates strengths from transaction cost and organizational capabilities literature but again, 
only theoretically rather than empirically.  
 There have, however, been some empirical tests demonstrating how concurrent sourcing of 
innovation and control processes enhance performance (Bradach, 1997), and how trucking firms use 
both internal truck-drivers as well as outsourced truck-drivers for efficiency, appropriability, and 
competition (He & Nickerson, 2006). Still, much more has been proposed than empirically tested. 
Accordingly, because performance is a multidimensional construct (e.g., competitive advantage, 
financial outcomes), not all sourcing decisions are perfectly optimal, and our knowledge about the 
implications of concurrent sourcing on performance can be enhanced through further empirical tests, 
therefore further investigation of the implications of concurrent sourcing on performance is necessary. 
Organizational Alignment 
 To further assess the effects of concurrent sourcing on performance, I also examine the 
relationship as a question of proper organizational alignment. Organizational alignment can be 
interpreted in a variety of ways. For contingency theorists, it means organizations aligning with 
environments (Lawrence & Lorsch, 1967). For others it is both the coordination of vertical and 
horizontal activities (Kathuria, Joshi, & Porth, 2007). In this study, I refer to alignment as the proximity 
of organizations’ observed actions in comparison to the actions predicted based on their internal 
characteristics (e.g., developmental capabilities) and external influences (e.g., market size) which are 





actually do and what they are predicted to do leads to better alignment; a determinant which scholars 
argue leads to better performance (Sampson, 2004).  
 The benefits of alignment provide organizations a natural way to tap into their strengths by 
following a prescribed strategy based on organization specific characteristics (i.e., get the most out of 
what you have). Alignment also allows organizations to reduce transaction costs by choosing to do what 
best suits the organization rather than unnecessarily searching and transacting (i.e., internally or 
externally) when it does not fit organizational characteristics. Albeit transitory periods may be necessary 
to make internal adjustments according to external shocks, organizations are best suited by acting 
strategically according to their characteristics.  
 Misalignment involves making inappropriate decisions that do not correspond with organization 
specific characteristics, leading to lower rates of survival (Bigelow, 2003; Silverman Nickerson & 
Freeman, 1997) and lower profits (Mayer, 2000). Misalignment occurs for a number of reasons, 
including irrational decision making (Tversky & Kahneman, 1986), bounded rationality (Simon, 1972), 
miscalculations, hubris, and changing conditions (Sampson, 2004). Often misalignment occurs 
especially in the short term as both managers and markets work toward equilibrium, reducing 
misalignment in the long term (Sampson, 2004; Williamson, 1985).  
  Costs and consequences of misalignment significantly and negatively impact performance 
(Yvrande-Billon & Saussier, 2005). From a TCE perspective this is often due to excessive opportunism 
hazards and excessive bureaucracy (Sampson, 2004). Excessive opportunism hazards occur when 
organizations need too much from the market (i.e., suppliers in this context), whereas excessive 
bureaucracy costs come when organizations are attempting to conduct too much of the business 
internally when in fact they are better suited to seek market-based suppliers. On the other hand, 





miss out on opportunities to add value and create dynamic capabilities (Winter, 2003). Whether hoping 
to align or trying to avoid misalignment, organizations discover better performance by acting in 
accordance with their characteristics and constraints.   
Too-Much-of-a-Good-Thing Effect (TMGT effect) 
 Finally, the impact of varying sourcing arrangements on performance is examined through 
curvilinear relationships. A growing body of work in strategic management suggests that predictor 
variables, often ones which have a positive impact, can have negative effects if taken too far (Pierce & 
Aguinis, 2013). This curvilinear relationship is depicted by the classic inverted U, demonstrating 
decreasing returns after a certain inflection point (or at least diminishing). Pierce and Aguinis (2013) 
recently published this as a meta-theoretical principle, suggesting that the TMGT effect is prevalent 
throughout many fields of management (e.g., strategy, entrepreneurship, and organizational behavior). 
They present diversification (i.e., vertical integration is a type of diversification) as an example of the 
TMGT effect in strategic management (e.g., Palich, Cardinal, & Miller, 2000; Qian, Li, Li, & Qian, 
2008). 
 Performance improvements from related diversification drop as organizations expand beyond 
their related capabilities (Markides & Williamson, 1996; Palich et al, 2000). This highlights problems 
from both the “too much” and the “too different” perspectives. Even more directly, performance 
declines with greater diversification (Lang & Stulz, 1994). More recently, scholars presented findings of 
curvilinearity in diversification (Qian, Li, Li, & Qian, 2008). This phenomenon extends to vertical 
integration, a form of diversification and the focus of this study. 
  Rothaermel and colleagues (2006) address the degree to which vertical integration and strategic 
acquisitions are beneficial. For strategic acquisitions they find product portfolio, new product success 





examine tapered integration (i.e., concurrent sourcing), finding positive effects on products for an 
organization that makes and buys the same inputs (i.e., balancing vertical integration and strategic 
acquisitions). It is unknown whether similar findings will occur for human capital within the value 
chain. Additionally, their results for strategic acquisitions are significant but only partially supported for 
vertical integration. These two differences provide room for my study to incrementally contribute to 
work on the TMGT effect. Professional baseball allows me to address the issues for the acquisition of 
human capital and the elusive optimization of concurrent sourcing.   
Context: Major League Baseball (MLB) 
Professional athletics is a proven and effective context for many organizational phenomena 
(Wolfe et al, 2005). The use of sports data to facilitate management research has been recognized at 
major conferences (e.g., Academy of Management) as well as in prominent management journals (Katz, 
2001; Seifried, Soebbing, Washington, & Bendickson, 2014). Seifried and colleagues (2014) specifically 
highlight the underdeveloped potential sports data provide. Sports data are useful due to accuracy, 
consistency, and collection over relatively long periods of time, and they provide excellent measures of 
success and failure (Schrage, 2013). This is ideal for testing concepts in strategic management. For 
example, Holcomb, Holmes, and Connelly (2009) used National Football League (NFL) data to examine 
managerial ability, resource quality, resource value creation, and organizational performance. More 
closely related to human capital, Wright and colleagues studied fit between human resources and 
strategy among NCAA basketball teams (Wright, Smart, & McMahan, 1995). Many management topics 
have also been explored using MLB data. Some of these include relational mechanism of embeddedness 
through trades (Barden & Mitchel, 2007), pay distribution-performance relationships (Bloom, 1999), 
pay equity (Howard & Miller, 1993), resource divestment capability (Moliterno & Wiersema, 2007), 





& Lotz, 1979; Audas, Dobson, & Goddard, 2002), and competitive advantage (Poppo & Weigelt, 2000). 
The following sub-sections describe important details about MLB as it pertains to concurrent sourcing of 
human capital.  
The Developmental System 
To examine how teams finalize their rosters, I focus on the process of acquiring players, and 
explain the functions of the developmental system, namely why organizations might choose a strategy 
which emphasizes using its developmental system or a strategy of acquiring players from other 
professional rosters. Additionally, I describe the use of trades and free agency as means of acquiring 
human capital, and important financial aspects of MLB. MLB franchises (i.e., the professional and 
developmental teams under one umbrella organization) have several ways to obtain players: the draft, 
international draft, trades with other teams, and acquiring players in the external market (i.e., free 
agency). Once players are obtained, franchises can cultivate talent through their developmental 
programs (also known as minor leagues or farm systems), if players are not ready for the professional 
roster.  
 There are primarily two ways in which a MLB franchise can sign contracts with non-professional 
players: The first-year player draft and the international draft. This is how franchises acquire a majority 
of the players that they “make.” The first-year player draft takes place in June and involves all 30 MLB 
franchises (MLB.com, 2013), each of which selects amateur players. The pool of players eligible for the 
draft include unsigned high school players who have decided to forego college, junior college players 
(who are eligible to be drafted at any time) or players participating at four-year colleges and universities 
who have completed their third year of college (i.e., applies to college players who choose to attend a 
four-year institution) (MLB.com, 2013). Once franchises know which players are draft-eligible, they 





the previous season with priority given to poorer performing teams in order to increase parity throughout 
the league as long as they are able to offer competitive contracts and signing bonuses. 
 A second opportunity for signing undrafted players is during the international signing period. 
This process begins July 2nd and allows franchises to offer contracts to international prospects. To be 
eligible players must be classified as amateur, meaning they have not signed a professional contract, be a 
resident of a country outside of the U.S., Canada, or a U.S. territory (e.g., Puerto Rico), and be at least 
17 years of age before September of that year (MLB.com, 2013). Many of the talented players sign 
contracts in early July; however this period extends through June 15th of the following year (MLB.com, 
2013). As with the domestic draft, selection order is determined to provide poorer performing teams 
with earlier choices.  
 After players sign contracts, most enter a club’s developmental system rather than immediately 
join the professional roster. For this reason all drafted players enter franchises under what I label the 
“make” categorization. Players join one of the franchise’s developmental teams at the beginning of the 
next season. Each team’s developmental system contains six levels of play, and the placement level of a 
newly drafted player depends on his ability. From novice to advanced, there are two levels known as 
“rookie ball,” two levels of Class A (i.e., Low A and High A), Class AA, and Class AAA. For example, 
the Minnesota Twins have the following developmental teams in their system (from lowest to highest 
level): Gulf Coast League Twins, Elizabethton Twins, Cedar Rapids Kernels, Fort Meyers Miracle, New 
Britain Rock Cats, and the Rochester Red Wings (Baseball Reference, 2013).  
 Once assigned to a level of play in the developmental system, a player’s progression depends on 
his performance and demand in upper leagues (or on the professional roster). There is no definitive time 
frame for players to make a professional roster, an aspect of uncertainty that comes with developing 





talented players often advance through the developmental system in one to two years. Others may 
advance much slower or not at all. Since each franchise has six developmental teams, many players 
never make it to the professional roster. Finally, in addition to signing amateur players for development, 
franchises can also acquire players from other professional rosters through trades, or sign players who 
have entered free agency. These more experienced players are generally more costly, but are often able 
to make an immediate impact on a team’s professional roster.  
Trades  
 Most trading occurs between two franchises but trades can involve multiple franchises. Trades 
often occur between seasons and for a variety of reasons and represent a form of cooperation in MLB. 
First, as valuable professional players near the end of their contracts, they may be traded in exchange for 
other professional players or for developmental level prospects. This might occur when a team realizes 
its inability, or unwillingness, to retain the professional player’s contract and thus tries to get something 
in return rather than losing the player to free agency. Although the exchange may only be for 
developmental level players, the trade is a means to acquire prospects who might soon contribute to the 
professional roster. For example, the Cleveland Indians traded pitcher Cliff Lee, whom they did not 
intend to re-sign, to the Philadelphia Phillies just prior to the trade deadline (i.e., July 31) in 2009. This 
provided the Phillies with an elite pitcher whom they needed to perform well in the playoffs and in 
exchange the Cleveland Indians received four lessor known players whom they sought to develop 
(Stark, 2009). 
 Relatedly, trades might occur because teams are looking to unload high priced players during a 
failing season (i.e., lack of wins and/or poor financial performance) in order to save money and begin 
rebuilding for the following year. These fire sales, as they are called, generally happen during an 





other teams in contention to make the playoffs. For example, in 2012 the Miami Marlins traded Josh 
Johnson, Jose Reyes, Mark Buehrle, John Buck, and Emilio Bonifacio to the Toronto Blue Jays for 
seven lessor known players, all of whom had relatively low compensation. This deal removed $146.5M 
(over the duration of these contracts) from the Miami Marlins payroll (ESPN, 2012) and provided the 
Blue Jays with exceptional talent for immediate placement on its professional roster.   
 Finally, a team may have a very good player in its developmental system that it would like to 
promote to the professional roster. If a team already has a higher paid player at that position, it’s logical 
to trade that player to make room for newly developed talent. For example, between the 2003 and 2004 
season, the Minnesota Twins promoted Joe Mauer, a very talented developmental player to be the 
starting catcher, leading to a trade of catcher A.J. Pierzynski to the San Francisco Giants for Joe Nathan, 
Francisco Liriano, and Boof Bonser. This exchange benefitted the Minnesota Twins in many ways; the 
prospects turned into valuable professional players and Joe Mauer became one of the best catchers in 
baseball (Bleacher Report, 2008).  
 As I explain later, players acquired through trades are categorized as “bought” if they join the 
professional roster in less than two full seasons after being acquired by a team but “made” for those who 
spend two or more seasons in the acquiring team’s developmental system.  
Free Agency 
 The final of four mechanisms to acquire players is through free agency. MLB regulates the 
process of acquiring and keeping players, giving rights to both players and franchises. Upon signing an 
amateur player, a franchise controls that player’s rights for six years. Franchises may trade or release 





eligible for salary arbitration after the third year of their initial contract.1 Generally a player’s agent and 
the franchise come to an agreement before arbitration takes place, sometimes extending the player’s 
contract beyond his eligibility for free agency. However, if agreement is not reached, an arbitrator 
determines an appropriate salary for the player (Baseball Prospectus, 2013). Following arbitration, and 
assuming the player and franchise have not negotiated another contract, a player becomes a free agent 
after his sixth year.  
Free agency allows a player to sign a contract with any interested franchise and is the first 
opportunity for a player to choose his destination (i.e., assuming multiple teams are interested). A 
player’s value in free agency largely depends on the market for his services. Interested franchises must 
have a need for the player’s skills and also have the capital available to acquire the player; typically 
players earn higher salaries when they sign a free agent contract. For example, while Prince Fielder 
averaged ~$6M per year with the Milwaukee Brewers from 2006-2011, the following year he signed a 
contract with the Detroit Tigers for $23M per year (Baseball Reference, 2013). Hence, players may 
switch franchises to obtain larger contracts if they do not receive a competitive offer from their current 
teams before their contracts expire.2  
 So how exactly do all these forms of human capital sourcing in MLB, the drafting and contract 
signing of talent, arbitration, trading and free agency, provide information about the make versus buy 
decision? Although players progressing through the developmental system are typically paid less at 
                                                          
1 This explanation is for basic reasons which suffice for the purpose of this project. However, contracts 
are much more complicated in how service time is calculated (e.g., differences exist when players are 
first brought up to the professional roster and in terms of how many times they are sent back down to the 
minor league system).  
2 For example, Joe Mauer stayed with the Minnesota Twins although it was rumored his value in free 
agency would have fetched a larger contract (Lebowitz, 2011). However, this “home-town” deal rarely 
works out if franchises do not resign players before reaching free agency as this may cause some hurt 
feelings and resentment on the player side if not offered a competitive contract before free agency 






earlier stages of their career, the resources devoted to a strong developmental program are costly, and 
often include signing bonuses to initially attract players. Thus, while it takes more effort (e.g., more 
scouts, better minor leagues coaches), putting emphasis on the developmental program can provide an 
organization’s professional roster with a consistent pipeline of quality players. In comparison, 
professional players acquired via trade or free agency may not require much development from the 
acquiring team but they often demand higher salaries. While initial contracts may seem inequitable to 
young players, they still have a lot to prove and, in the meantime, require much coaching, training, and 
facilities. Within this system, young players who progress quickly are of tremendous value. Take, for 
example, 22 year old Mike Trout of the California Angels, who was one of the best players during the 
2012 season yet was compensated just slightly more than the league minimum (Jaffe, 2012) as restricted 
players are usually underpaid (Krautmann, von Allmen, & Berri, 2009). Accordingly, all teams desire 
some young talent coming up through their developmental system. By examining the number of 
acquired players on a team’s professional roster, one can surmise what strategy a team emphasizes.  
Payroll Cap, Luxury Tax, and Revenue Sharing 
 A unique aspect of MLB is the absence of a payroll cap, which is used in all other major U.S. 
professional sports leagues (i.e., NFL, NBA, and NHL) to give small-market teams an equal chance of 
assembling a successful team, thus promoting competitive balance (Fort & Quirk, 1995). The absence of 
a payroll cap allows players to earn up to their market value as free agents (i.e., how top managers are 
compensated in business organizations) but highlights the large disparity in purchasing power between 
large-market teams (e.g., New York, Los Angeles, and Boston) and small-market teams (e.g., 
Cincinnati, Tampa Bay, Kansas City). Market size is not a determinant of team performance (Schmidt & 
Berri, 2002), but there are some positive effects that may come from large-market opportunities (e.g., 





 However, in addition to allowing poorer performing teams preference in drafting players, MLB 
also established a luxury tax and revenue-sharing program as means to narrow payroll disparity. The 
luxury tax, formally called the Competitive Balance Tax, dissuades teams from spending excessive 
amounts on players’ salaries. A threshold for player payroll is established by league management; for 
example, in 2013 it was $178M (Sporting Charts, 2013). Teams may exceed this amount but are taxed 
on payroll that exceeds the limit. The tax rate increases for each successive year a team exceeds the 
limit. Currently this rate begins at 17.5%, followed by 30% and 40% percent for the next two years and 
finally reaching a maximum of 50% for four time offenders. This rate appears to deter most teams. For 
example, in 2013 only the New York Yankees (~$229M) and the Los Angeles Dodgers (~$217M) 
exceeded the $178M threshold (USA Today, 2013). Notably however, the record setting tax the 
Yankees had to pay in 2013 is comparable to the whole Houston Astros payroll (Nightengale, 2013), 
leading some to question whether the penalty is severe enough. Over time certain large market teams’ 
fans (e.g., New York Yankees) have even grown to expect paying luxury taxes (Pesca, 2014). The 
luxury tax provides consequences for overspending and is used by the league for pre-designed purposes, 
but the tax money is not redistributed to other teams.  
 Another method aimed to keep the league competitive is the revenue-sharing program, which is 
essentially a subsidy for small-market franchises. Unlike some professional sports leagues (e.g., the 
NFL) where revenue is earned on a national level, much of MLB revenue is generated and retained on 
the local level. The concern is that small-market teams cannot generate the local revenue of large-market 
teams and therefore will not have the revenue to acquire adequate talent to be competitive. As a remedy, 
MLB created a system in which all teams pay 31% of net local revenue to be combined and equally 
distributed to all teams (CBS News, 2008). Large-market teams, such as the Boston Red Sox, are known 





small-market teams, such as the Pittsburgh Pirates, are known as “Revenue Sharing Payee Clubs” (i.e., 
teams that receive a portion of the additional marginal rate) (Brown, 2010; Thurm, 2012). Thus, 
regardless of market share, all teams should have resources which allow them to be active in the free 
agent market.  
Finding a Competitive Strategy 
Although MLB established a luxury tax and a revenue-sharing system, team payrolls are far from equal. 
In 2013, the top seven highest team payrolls were, on average, $124M more than the seven lowest team 
payrolls (USA Today, 2013). To illustrate this point, individual players on large-market teams (e.g., 
Alex Rodriguez of the New York Yankees has an individual salary of ~$25M) can make salaries equal 
to large portions of other teams’ entire payrolls. It would seem this imbalance might provide large-
market teams with a significant performance advantage. However, due to the strength of developmental 
programs and the inherent uncertainty of future performance, even for star players, this is not always the 
case. With less revenue, small-market teams may choose to adopt a make rather than buy approach as 
their formula for success. To accomplish this, small-market teams might trade their soon to be expensive 
top talent for high potential minor league players in hopes of building a younger and cheaper yet still 
talented team. Bill DeWitt Jr., the Yale (B.A.) and Harvard (M.B.A.) educated Chairman of the St. 
Louis Cardinals stated “we set out way back in ’96 to be a consistent contender and we continue to have 
that goal. It’s one of the reasons we put so much emphasis on building the farm system and building our 
scouting” (Hummel, 2013, para. 8). So if this strategy is implemented successfully, often with a balance 
of making and buying, capitalizing on both capabilities and cost reductions, small-market teams can be 
as competitive as large-market teams. Six of twenty teams that competed in the World Series from 2002-
2011 were small-market teams (e.g., consider the small-market Tampa Bay Rays of 2008 with a payroll 





interesting and appropriate context to examine optimal human capital sourcing strategies to obtain 





CHAPTER III: THEORY AND HYPOTHESES 
 Concurrent sourcing is best viewed through multiple theoretical lenses (e.g., Parmigiani, 2007). 
For this study, I use TCE and organizational capabilities to understand and advance knowledge of 
concurrent sourcing. A growing body of work has blended the two theories, proposing that balancing 
cost reduction and capability advancement may lead to more realistic and complementary conclusions 
(e.g., Holcomb & Hitt, 2007; Mayer & Salomon, 2006). Therefore, using the TCE logic and then sorting 
through the capabilities rationale, theory and hypotheses are developed to identify factors which impact 
the sourcing decision, and examine how that decision affects performance outcomes.   
Buyer-Supplier Relations 
Reducing Costs through TCE 
 The sourcing decision has typically been examined through TCE, starting with Coase’s (1937) 
work and further developed throughout much of Oliver Williamson’s career (e.g., Williamson, 1975; 
1981; 1985; 1999). TCE identifies the transaction as the unit of analysis with a goal to reduce 
transaction costs and determine to make or to buy accordingly (Jager & Woke, 2008). TCE posits that 
these decisions are fueled by asset specificity, uncertainty, and frequency while working under the 
necessary assumptions of bounded rationality and opportunism (Williamson, 1985). Asset specificity 
has been dubbed the locomotive of TCE (Williamson, 1985); as assets are more specific to an 
organization, the organization will more likely need to produce the input (i.e., human capital) internally 
(Williamson, 1981). Highly specific assets are difficult to find in the market and organizations that do 
not produce these will be vulnerable to a host of potentially negative consequences (e.g., holdup costs). 
Asset specificity also often refers to the ability to redeploy assets, generally suggesting more specific 





Beyond asset specificity, organizations typically strive to avoid multiple types of uncertainty, 
which literature reviews have found take on many forms. For example, a review by David and Han 
(2004) identified three categories and 24 different forms of uncertainty in the TCE literature. A more 
recent study by Crook and colleagues (2013) also identified three primary categories of uncertainty 
capturing many different forms. Recognizing its many forms, Geyskens, et al (2006) categorize 
uncertainty according to three categories, behavioral, technological, and volume. Behavioral uncertainty 
refers to how difficult it is to verify agreement (Poppo & Zanger, 2002), with greater difficulty causing 
organizations to prefer hierarchical governance (i.e., make). Technological uncertainty is the degree to 
which future technology is unknown (Stump & Heide, 1996), with greater unknowns leading 
organizations to prefer market governance (i.e., buy). Volume uncertainty relates to unknown quantities 
in the relationship (John & Weitz, 1988), such that as quantities fluctuate and deviate organizations 
typically favor hierarchical governance (Geyskens et al, 2006). Hence, sourcing decisions are contingent 
on reducing transaction costs from a variety of uncertainty perspectives and although greater asset 
specificity often leads to hierarchical governance, greater uncertainty often leads to market governance.  
Last, the frequency of transactions will fuel decisions. When needs are infrequent, an 
organization should seek the market but when the frequency of transactions is high or regular, 
organizations should consider internal production. In short, frequency refers to how often transactions 
reoccur. This dimension has received limited attention (Geyskens et al, 2006; Rindfleisch & Heide, 
1997), an issue I seek to address and advance theoretically.  
 Despite the popularity of explaining vertical integration and strategic acquisitions based on the 
reduction of transaction costs, TCE has remained somewhat silent on the idea of concurrent sourcing 
(e.g., David & Han, 2004; Parmigiani, 2007). Yet more recent reviews (Geyskens et al, 2006) suggest 





The reduction of transaction costs does not merely suggest the selection of make versus buy, but rather, 
the choice to concurrently source may also provide the greatest reduction of transaction costs contingent 
on the problem or organizational situation. Thus, TCE may do more than distinguish between make and 
buy. 
 Organizations traditionally consider making for greater control but, when assets are less specific, 
organizations are more likely to defer to the market for the most efficient mode of organizing and also 
because less specific assets have lower interdependence and embeddedness (Geyskens et al, 2006; 
Williamson, 1975; 1985). In relation to TCE, much more is known and tested in regards to asset 
specificity. The theoretical work has been novel (Williamson, 1975; 1985) and the empirical tests have 
been significant (see David & Han, 2004; Geyskens et al, 2006). To enhance the TCE view I have 
selected a setting in which asset specificity is low and employees have high skill transferability 
(Campbell, Coff, & Kryscynski, 2012) in order to more readily focus on uncertainty and frequency, 
areas that have received less attention but which are critical to concurrent sourcing. Some scholars 
suggest uncertainty and frequency have little predictive power without asset specificity and that asset 
specificity is a necessary condition for the make decision (David & Han, 2004), but this is not consistent 
through all of the literature or in more recent reviews (Geyskens et al, 2006) as some suggest the 
presence of other important factors (Crook, Combs, Ketchen, & Aguinis, 2013). Geyskens and 
colleagues (2006) actually find the combined effect of uncertainty had greater impacts on governance 
choice. Accordingly, my work helps answer two important questions regarding TCE: (1) Under what 
circumstances do organizations still make even though low asset specificity directs organizations 






 As mentioned, reviews of uncertainty often define it as behavioral, technological, or related to 
volume (e.g., Crook et al, 2013; Geyskens et al, 2006); however uncertainty also takes on a multitude of 
types (see Macher & Richman, 2008) such as performance ambiguity, prior experience, risk and even 
other categorical forms such as market based, for example in demand or price changes (see David & 
Han, 2004). When considering human capital sourcing, this conceptualization of uncertainty may be 
insufficient. Volume uncertainty does not apply as there are consistently 25 members on each major 
league roster. Behavioral uncertainty is “the degree of difficulty in verifying whether compliance with 
established agreements has occurred” (Geyskens et al, 2006, p. 525), also not a clear fit for this problem. 
Many of these uncertainty studies pertain to other problems rather than human capital such as retail and 
manufacturing (Yu, Yan, & Cheng, 2001), biotech alliances (Santoro & McGill, 2005), and metals 
(Hennart, 1988). This leads to the conclusion that when applying TCE to human capital sourcing, other 
less examined forms of uncertainty must be considered. Rather than redefine or relax the definition, I 
focus on talent uncertainty. While talent uncertainty has been addressed in non-TCE contexts (e.g., 
Kräkel, & Schöttner, 2010), the closest operationalization might be related to prior experience (i.e., 
experience of organizations in production and experience of organizations with alliances) as used in 
previous research (David & Han, 2004). Talent uncertainty could also be considered a form of 
technological uncertainty, if you define technology as consisting of the human skills and professions that 
are required to perform work (Barbash, 1984). Henceforth, I address talent uncertainty, which is a more 
applicable route for scholars studying uncertainty of human capital through the TCE perspective.  
While organizations bear higher levels of talent uncertainty when emphasizing the development 
of human capital because these employees are evolving, they may also enter the market to purchase 
already developed and less uncertain human capital necessary for their value chain. Hence, at the onset, 





remains relatively unknown. Internally developed human capital comes with previously specified 
benefits and may turn out to be valuable but talent often develops gradually or plateaus at various stages 
in the developmental process and therefore designing an organization too heavily vertically integrated 
yields greater talent uncertainty. For example, a line manager may be an excellent decision maker when 
it comes to technical choices but once promoted to middle or upper management may lack the 
conceptual skills necessary to make decisions about an organization’s vision. Similarly, minor league 
baseball players may have great hitting or pitching success at lower levels of the developmental system 
but talent uncertainty remains as to whether these skills will transfer to higher levels.  
Alternatively, acquiring “proven” human capital from other organizations reduces talent 
uncertainty, even if it costs more. These employees have shown an ability to perform at the highest 
level, so talent uncertainty is less of an issue. The correlation is not perfect, but prior performance is 
generally a good predictor of future performance, especially when prior performance was achieved at an 
equivalent level of difficulty. While there is some uncertainty in the market (i.e., it is unknown whether 
the appropriate players will be available), appropriate planning and bargaining makes this a more secure 
option. Also, although outside acquisitions are sometimes associated with high risk due to poorer 
performance when leaving one organization for another (Groysberg, Nanda, & Nohria, 2004), when 
talent uncertainty is high, acquiring bought talent reduces this type of uncertainty and provides faster 
speed to market, making this choice particularly valuable in the short run. Therefore, in cases where 
asset specificity is low, and talent uncertainty varies by organization due to differences in human capital, 
the desire to reduce talent uncertainty will lead organizations to concurrently source, but to prefer 
strategic acquisitions as uncertainty increases.  







 After addressing uncertainty, I now examine the third leg of the TCE stool (i.e., frequency) to 
help explain the logic for organizational sourcing of human capital. Organizations must deal with 
frequencies of input turnover, whether it is the frequency of machine breakdowns or frequency of human 
capital changes. Variability and transactions costs both address how and why organizations take certain 
actions concerning frequencies of input changes. I begin by addressing TCE logic and then rule out 
variability. I posit therefore, that when asset specificity is low (as in this case), TCE provides superior 
logic regarding frequencies of human capital turnover in comparison to variation arguments.  
 TCE research suggests that when frequencies of input turnover or transactions are low, 
organizations have greater incentives to buy (Williamson, 1985) because producing internally for 
infrequent transactions requires high administrative costs and therefore produces a low payoff. In the 
case of product inputs, frequencies fluctuate due to customer demands yet the internal process demands 
are quite predictable (e.g., an assembly line). However, in the case of human capital, frequencies 
fluctuate based on customer demands and also due to less predictable employee turnover. Yet the 
context of MLB falls between more predictable assembly lines and less predictable employee turnover 
because contracts restrict players from moving to other teams, a similar yet exaggerated version of non-
compete clauses required by certain organizations (e.g., staffing companies and law firms). Although 
there is some unpredictability with player injury, MLB franchises confront fewer unforeseen 
circumstances impacting organizational personnel (e.g., person-organization fit) than do business 
organizations and thus MLB allows generalizations about non-human capital inputs as well. High 
turnover is associated with higher transaction costs but, when frequencies are low, buying this input 
from the market is more logical because building capabilities for inputs that are infrequently transacted 
is a large commitment with low payoff. Accordingly, due to the nature of human capital, organizations 





 Next, attending to frequency concerns in the supply chain is often relegated to production, rather 
than human capital. With products, systems exist such as six sigma to reduce production variation 
concerning frequency of replacements, thus allowing for lower variation for internalizing product inputs 
relative to human capital inputs. However, even when developing internal capabilities to address the 
frequency problem, in the case of human assets, capabilities do not reach completion or maximization 
after a specific series of events or duration of time. In short, due to variability in human development, 
the capabilities logic is less useful in accounting for turnover frequency than it might be when 
addressing production frequency. Additionally, the variability of inputs is less a function of problematic 
assessment in this context. Therefore, organizations must utilize external as well as internal resources to 
address speed to market concerns when dealing with human capital and cannot solely focus on internal 
capabilities. Hence, although variation may seem like attractive explanation for frequency, the rationale 
behind this argument is less convincing when examining human assets. Accordingly, TCE plays the 
greatest role in directing concurrent sourcing due to turnover frequencies, a logic which suggests the 
following hypothesis. 
H1b When turnover frequencies are high, organizations will prefer vertical integration to 
strategic acquisitions.   
 
Creating Synergy through Organizational Capabilities 
 
 TCE is a prominent and often fundamental mid-range theory explaining sourcing, but other 
theories are also useful. Even with much work in these areas, TCE has not been utilized to explain 
concurrent sourcing (Parmigiani, 2007). The following presents the rationale for the capabilities view 
which has been applied to sourcing (Argyres, 1996; Parmigiani, 2007). By organizational capabilities, I 
consider the literature from both the RBV and Grant’s (1996) work on the knowledge based view 
(KBV). These perspectives (Barney, 1991; Grant, 1996; Wernerfelt, 1984) are particularly helpful for 





competencies, relatedness (Markides & Williamson, 1996), and the potential for synergy (Barney, 1991; 
Penrose, 1959; Wernerfelt, 1984). Here, vertical integration and strategic acquisitions of human capital 
can work together to synergistically enhance resources within the organization. Such potential is derived 
from the VRINS framework which determines the overall strength of a resource based on its Value, 
Rareness, Imitability, and Non-substitutability (Wernerfelt, 1989). These types of resources have greater 
potential to lead to capabilities and a stronger likelihood of providing competitive advantages to an 
organization.  
 Because concurrent sourcing includes suppliers and internal processes to obtain human capital, 
capabilities are not bound to the focal organization. Organizations may develop some inputs, and they 
may rely on the capabilities of others; this view blends concurrent sourcing with the relational view, a 
more recent extension of organizational capabilities and RBV (Dyer & Singh, 1998; Lavie, 2006). From 
this perspective, organizations use capabilities, including organization specific routines and bundled 
resources (Madhok, 1996) to identify the most value-added means of obtaining the greatest talent, a 
view that differs from the economizing strategies of TCE.  
 Organizations that see potential for collaboration between internal processes and strategic 
acquisitions can optimize these opportunities by utilizing internal talent where applicable but seeking 
talent acquisitions when necessary. While some organizations have superior processes at the core of 
their operation, others may have these capabilities throughout the value chain. It is important for 
organizations to recognize these capabilities and strategically act on them. Organizations with lessor 
capabilities should seek acquisitions in greater numbers because internal processes are not enhancing 
their core competencies. Alternatively, organizations that have superior capabilities, while they may 





Therefore this view suggests that regardless of transactions costs, organizations with strong capabilities 
will seek to use them which gives rise to the following hypothesis.  
H2a Better internal capabilities will lead to more vertical integration rather than strategic 
acquisitions. 
 
 Parmigiani argues that “the greater the expertise of the firm and its suppliers, the more likely the 
firm will concurrently source” (2007, p. 292). However, it is also likely that experience and knowledge 
will lead to continuance. That is, organizations that concurrently source still have a tendency (i.e., 
routine) to either make or buy a majority of their inputs. Their prior strategic actions will provide a 
strong indication of the future. Organizations become static, reliable and inert which is often referred to 
as punctuated equilibrium (Romanelli & Tushman, 1994). Without some major event, this experience, 
routine, and knowledge will lead an organization down the same path in terms of sourcing. 
 TCE may support this rationale by suggesting economization on current processes to reduce 
transactions, but TCE might also suggest abruptly switching due to transaction cost based changes over 
time. However, simply abiding by transaction costs does not account for activities for which some 
organizations are superior to others. Conversely, the organizational capabilities view suggests 
organizations continue to enhance their knowledge and experience in one realm over the other (i.e., 
vertical integration or strategic acquisitions). Mayer and colleagues also theorize that prior acquisition 
decisions influence human capital because experience produces systematic differences in capabilities 
(Mayer, Somaya, & Williamson, 2012). Furthermore, experience also develops absorptive capacity (i.e., 
the ability to acquire this knowledge). Therefore, absorptive capacity, experience, routines, and 
knowledge which are all fundamental to the organizational capabilities view suggest that organizations 
involved in concurrent sourcing will become more proficient in how they have conducted this business, 
and hence continue in this direction. Thus, organizational capabilities suggest powerful logic in regards 





H2b Organizations with greater experience in vertical integration or strategic acquisitions will 
continue to favor this strategy as they concurrently source. 
 
 Resources are often broken into four categories: social capital (Dyer & Singh, 1998), human 
capital (Lepak & Snell, 1999), technology or knowledge (Grant, 1996), and financial capital.3 In this 
study and in the realm of acquiring human capital more generally, organizational resources primarily 
come in the form of human capital, or financial capital necessary to acquire human capital. 
Consequently, organizations in larger markets have advantages in accessing capital through larger fan 
bases, lucrative television contracts, et cetera. Hence, acquiring human capital and providing 
competitive advantages as talent is accessed quickly through acquisitions rather than through 
internalization is prominent in larger markets due to their financial advantages over small market teams.  
 Although capital (i.e., wealth in the form of money or assets) contingent on market size is 
valuable and somewhat inimitable, few would argue it is rare. Accordingly, market size alone does not 
meet all of the conditions for a resource to provide sustainable competitive advantages. However, 
positioning in larger markets is often tied to a variety of capabilities. Furthermore, this access to 
resources provides enhancements to performance which allow organizations to attract better employees, 
provide cutting edge facilities, and focus on opportunities (e.g., gain market share through various 
enhancements). Even if there is an inflection point after which capital provides diminishing returns, 
organizations can achieve better performance if they are above a minimum threshold. When purchasing 
an input in the market, an organization must pay a premium if the input possesses valuable and proven 
capabilities ready for immediate use. Organizations have the option of making inputs internally but the 
process is costly and takes effort and time. However, capital in this context also includes human capital 
and human capital fulfills the VRINS framework and thereby positions an organization for sustainable 
competitive advantage. Consequently, organizations with more capital due to their positioning in larger 
                                                          





markets have advantages in developing certain capabilities but also more options to strategically acquire 
other valuable yet often costly inputs. Ultimately, because demand is not always predictable and urgency 
is often required, organizations with more available capital will acquire talent from the market in greater 
numbers.  
H2c Organizations with more capital will strategically acquire in greater numbers. 
 
Organizational Performance 
 Performance is arguably the most important construct in strategic management research 
(Richard, Devinney, Yip, & Johnson, 2009). Over the years, management scholars have investigated the 
determinants and contingencies of organizational performance to explain performance heterogeneity 
among structurally similar organizations (Combs, Crook, & Shook, 2005). This research assumes 
organizational strategy impacts organizational performance (Lubatkin & Shrieves, 1986) and views 
human capital as fundamental to organizational performance (Castanias & Helfat, 2001; Farjoun, 2002; 
Gambardella, Panico, & Valentini, 2013; Huselid, Jackson, & Schuler, 1997; Wright & McMahan, 
1992). In this extensive literature, performance has been measured many ways (e.g., accounting 
measures, finance measures, operational measures, power, legitimacy, corporate social responsibility, 
and so forth), but in this context I look to better understand the impact of sourcing on competitive 
advantage and how competitive advantage leads to financial performance outcomes. 
 Competitive advantage has been measured in a variety of ways. Poppo and Weigelt (2000, p. 
586) measured it as “the accumulated skill set of free agents” (e.g., a combination of runs created, all-
star votes and so forth). Researchers have also used survey questions about low cost, differentiation, and 
switching costs (Kearns & Lederer, 2003; Parsons, 1983; Porter, 1980), a reduction of defects in 
semiconductor manufacturing (Hatch & Dyer, 2004), and total quality management scales to 





measures but competitive advantage is often poorly defined and operationalized (Ma, 2000). As in this 
dissertation, others also suggest competitive advantage comes from organizational competencies yet is 
part of an organization’s strategy and hence leads to other performance outcomes as well (Hofer & 
Schendel, 1978; Ma, 2000).  
 Because it is assumed that organizations can pursue different levels of concurrent sourcing to 
achieve competitive advantage, one cannot predict a priori that higher levels of strategic acquisition or 
vertical integration will, on average, positively impact performance. As explained earlier, MLB 
franchises may decide to improve the stock of their human capital by emphasizing the development 
system or through a judicious use of free agency and trades. Accordingly, merely examining the effects 
of number of acquired players on competitive advantage may yield non-significant results. However, 
one can predict that an organization’s concurrent sourcing strategy must be properly aligned with an 
organization’s characteristics to positively affect competitive advantage and, similarly, excessive 
reliance on either strategic sourcing or vertical integration may negatively affect performance. 
Organizational Alignment 
 There are however some alternative explanations to these talent sourcing decisions. 
Organizations make decisions based on their characteristics, and strategies for one organization may not 
apply to another. For example, consider two basic organizational strategies, cost leadership versus 
differentiation (Porter, 1980). It may not be logical for organizations with different foci to carry the 
same balance of low cost versus differentiated products or services. Rather, organizations should align 
their product or service offerings with antecedents that drive their focus to ensure better performance 
(Sender, 1997). Sampson (2004) examines misalignment. She finds the costs of excessive contracting 





sourcing decisions may limit an organization’s capabilities, restricting the potential competitive 
advantage if actions lack alignment with prescriptions. 
 Some have studied alignment through the transaction cost lens (e.g., Johansson, 2008; Sampson, 
2004). Others focused on the consequences of misalignment (Yvrande-Billon & Saussier, 2005). 
Interestingly, while scholars contemplate whether TCE and organizational capabilities better predict 
alignment (Yvrande-Billon & Saussier, 2005), both theories favor the fundamentals of alignment 
strategies. Translated to this case, human capital should be either developed or acquired based on 
predictions of TCE and organizational capabilities logic. TCE proposes cost reduction through better 
alignment. For example, TCE predicts that organizations with high turnover frequencies and also high 
vertical integration will have greater competitive advantage than organizations that would be considered 
by TCE to be mismatched or misaligned (i.e., low turnover frequencies and high vertical integration or 
high turnover frequencies and low vertical integration). On the other hand, organizational capabilities 
predicts organizations may augment their competitive advantage by matching actions with prescribed 
capabilities. For example, if organizations having an abundance of acquisition experience acquire many 
players, they will be tapping into this capability and are thus able to increase their competitive 
advantage. However, if they have great acquisition experience yet choose not to acquire personnel, they 
will be mismatched or misaligned and accordingly face poorer outcomes.  
Despite the differences between TCE and organizational capabilities, both frameworks suggest 
alignment is valuable. So while I attempt to differentiate between TCE and organizational capabilities to 
predict concurrent sourcing, the theoretical underpinnings of the two actually merge in the case of 
alignment. In short, both frameworks suggest that following the strategy predicted based on 
organizations’ specific characteristics and environmental conditions should create competitive 





 Accordingly, I propose that these ideas readily transfer to strategic human capital as each 
organization has different strengths and weaknesses in talent development and acquisition processes. 
Thus, by using the alignment logic which accounts for these differences, organizations will gain 
competitive advantages if concurrently sourced to resemble their strengths. For example, organizations 
that are better at training should develop/make in greater numbers than organizations that rank poorly at 
training. Hence, I hypothesize that sourcing may not be a one-size-fits-all scenario, but rather 
competitive advantage is contingent on organizations’ aligning their actual sourcing with the optimal 
predictions developed through antecedent variables.  
H3a: Organizations with more closely aligned predicted and actual concurrent sourcing will 
experience greater competitive advantage.  
The TMGT Effect 
 A second alternative to examine performance is through the TMGT effect. The TMGT effect is 
relatively well established for diversification (e.g., Qian et al, 2008) but not fully addressed for vertical 
integration or strategic acquisitions. Rothaermel and colleagues (2006) demonstrate that strategic 
acquisitions enhance new product size, success, and performance, but this occurs only to a certain extent 
and then the effects become negative. However, their study was less conclusive for vertical integration. 
Accordingly, I intend to address two important deficiencies in the concurrent sourcing literature. First, I 
examine inputs in terms of human capital rather than products and, second, I revisit the idea that vertical 
integration (and not just strategic acquisitions) has a curvilinear impact on competitive advantage, a 
relationship that seems all too theoretically explainable but was not found to be statistically significant 
in prior studies (Rothaermel et al, 2006). As opposed to production or manufacturing, vertically 
integrating human capital is advantageous only to a point due to the lack of lean manufacturing process 





integration and strategic acquisitions leads to strategic decisions to concurrently source, an idea that has 
been explored in manufacturing but not with human capital.  
 Products, services, and human capital have a place in the vertical integration literature. Yet due 
to their differences, it is unclear that the rationale used for one is generalizable to others. Vertical 
integration has deeper roots on the product side as shown in studies on the auto industry (Monteverde & 
Teece, 1982), manufacturing (Anderson, 1985), petroleum production (Armour & Teece, 1980), and so 
forth, which  describe factors affecting whether organizations do or do not vertically integrate. So, how 
might the integration of human capital differ from production or service? I suggest these varying inputs 
be looked at separately before making generalizations. Further, prior studies using products found only 
strategic acquisitions had a clear TMGT effect (Rothaermel et al, 2006); perhaps when examining 
human capital, the TMGT effect will be apparent for vertical integration, if exceeding a certain level of 
vertical integration forces organizations to rely too heavily on their own capabilities and networks to 
develop human talent. Alternatively, excessive levels of strategic acquisitions require organizations to 
evaluate too much talent, incur heavy search costs, and deal with less internal knowledge which makes 
organizations more susceptible to opportunism. In short, organizations heavily weighted in vertical 
integration or strategic acquisitions will risk diminishing competitive advantage. In contrast, 
organizations that are concurrently sourced will enhance competitive advantage by avoiding the pitfalls 
of overly internalized or overly acquired organizations. MLB offers an extraordinarily clear metric for 
addressing competitive advantage (i.e., team wins). If organizations can optimally balance sourcing, 
competitive advantage will be enhanced.  
H3b Strategic acquisitions will positively impact revenue but with diminishing returns such that 









 The theoretical relationship between competitive advantage and financial performance has been 
addressed in strategic management (e.g., Barney, 1991; Porter, 1985), but the construct of competitive 
advantage is less clear empirically (Ma, 2000). Competitive advantage comes in many forms, including 
shedding costs and creating synergies. Among the sources of competitive advantage are knowledge 
(Grant, 1996), social capital (Dyer & Singh, 1998), total quality management (Douglas & Judge, 2001; 
Powell, 1995), and human resource systems (Lado & Wilson, 1994), to name a few. Scholars often use 
competitive advantage to discuss their views of strategy suggesting “this” or “that” will lead to 
competitive advantages and, thus better performance. In this case, properly balanced sourcing is thought 
to lead to positive financial outcomes such as revenue or sales4 through competitive advantage. Despite 
certain examples discounting the value of competitive advantage, such as the rent appropriation problem 
(Coff, 1999) and low constraint general human capital (Campbell et al, 2012), most research assumes or 
confirms logic suggesting competitive advantage moderates or mediates financial performance (Ray, 
Barney, & Muhanna, 2004). I account for distinct differences in competitive advantages between 
organizations, positing that organizations must have strategies (e.g., concurrent sourcing) to gain 
competitive advantage before they can enhance financial performance. These ideas lead to the final 
hypotheses. 
H4a Competitive advantage will mediate the relationship between number acquired and revenue, 
yielding a positive indirect relationship.  
 
H4b Competitive advantage will mediate the relationship between number acquired and sales, 
yielding a positive indirect relationship.  
 
 Table 1 (below) presents a summary of the hypotheses. This table includes all of the hypotheses 
from Study 1 and Study 2.  
                                                          
4 Revenue is total amount of money each team receives while sales is operationalized as number of 





Table 1. Summary of Study Hypotheses 
 
H1a When talent uncertainty is high, organizations will prefer strategic acquisitions to 
vertical integration. 
H1b When turnover frequencies are high, organizations will prefer vertical integration to 
strategic acquisitions.   
H2a Better internal capabilities will lead to more vertical integration rather than strategic 
acquisitions. 
H2b Organizations with greater experience in vertical integration or strategic acquisitions 
will continue to favor this strategy as they concurrently source. 
H2c Organizations with more capital will strategically acquire in greater numbers. 
H3a Organizations with more closely aligned predicted and actual concurrent sourcing will 
experience greater competitive advantage. 
H3b Strategic acquisitions will positively impact revenue but with diminishing returns such 
that the relationship will resemble an inverted U-shape. 
H4a Competitive advantage will mediate the relationship between number acquired and 
revenue, yielding a positive indirect relationship.  
H4b Competitive advantage will mediate the relationship between number acquired and 





CHAPTER IV: RESEARCH DESIGN 
 The sample selection, procedures for data collection, and methods of analysis are described in 
this chapter.  
Sample and Variables 
 Archival data were collected for 30 Major League Baseball organizations spanning 10 years 
from 2002-2011. Data used in the analyses were collected from various sources, such as Baseball 
Almanac, Forbes, and USA Today, among others (see Table 2 for a complete list of sources matched 
with variables). A ten year sample provides an adequate snapshot of league roster composition. By 
ending in 2011 the data avoid complications created by rule changes in 2012 which impacted the 
amateur draft process (Baseball America, 2012). Although there were some other changes during these 
years,5 the duration represents a relatively stable time period to analyze the questions being asked. Each 
professional organization has 25 members on its roster. For each of these professionals, I identified 
whether they came through the organization’s minor league system (i.e., make) or whether they were 
acquired from another organization directly becoming a member of the professional roster (i.e., buy). As 
a caveat, if talent was acquired and placed in the developmental program for at least two full seasons, 
these individuals were considered to come up through the developmental system. Making this 
determination for each player/team/year was a lengthy process (i.e., nearly 10,000 determinations). To 
consistently select these 25 players for each team and year, I first identified the starting lineup, starting 
pitchers, primary relief pitchers, and closing pitcher according to categories on the Baseball Reference 
website based on players’ end of the season categorization. After selecting these players, any remaining 
spots on a team’s 25-man roster were filled by choosing non-pitchers in order of most games played for  
 
 
                                                          





Table 2. Variables and Sources 
 
Definition  Source  Independent Variables 
Professional Experience  The number of players on the team’s 25-man professional 
roster who have greater than six years of experience.  
Baseball 
Reference 
Annual Player Turnover  The number of players on the team’s 25-man professional 
roster who were not on the team’s roster the prior season. 
Baseball 
Reference 
Developmental Ranking  An annual ranking of each team’s developmental program 
(1-30), listing the best developmental program as 1 and the 
worst as 30. 
Baseball 
America  
Acquisition Experience  The number of players on the team’s 25-man professional 




Small-Market Size A dichotomous variable: 1 for teams that are in the 15 




Buy as Predicted A dichotomous variable: 1 for teams that acquire the 
number of players predicted. Teams that acquire 





Number Acquired The number of players on the team’s 25-man professional 
roster who were acquired. 
Baseball 
Reference 
Team Wins The number of wins the team has during the 162 game 
regular season.  
ESPN 
Made Playoffs A dichotomous variable: 1 for teams that made the 
playoffs, 0 for all other teams. 
Baseball 
Reference 
Revenue Annual team revenue (in millions of dollars). Forbes  
Average Attendance The team’s average attendance for home games. ESPN 
Control Variables 
  
Number of All-Stars The number of players on the team’s 25-man professional 
roster who were selected to play in the All-Star game. 
MLB.com 
Team Salary Annual aggregate compensation paid to all players on the 
team’s 25-man professional roster (in millions of dollars). 
USA Today 
Ownership Change A dichotomous variable: 1 for the initial three years a team 





A dichotomous variable: 1 for the initial three years a team 
has a new general manager, 0 for all other years. 
Baseball 
Reference 
New Stadium A dichotomous variable: 1 for the initial three years a team 
plays in a new stadium, 0 for all other years. 







the team that season. Finally, the players for each team and year were totaled in order to analyze the data 
at the team level. 
Independent Variables 
Table 2 is ordered in relation to the prior hypotheses for ease of readership. I briefly explain the 
rationale for each TCE based variable as it aligns with the hypotheses. Players with greater than 6 years 
of professional experience have demonstrated their abilities. For example, experienced outfielders are 
more likely to initiate movement in the correct direction when fielding fly balls (Oudejans, Michaels, & 
Bakker, 1997). Accordingly, Professional Experience seems an appropriate proxy for talent uncertainty 
in assessing these players’ future performance such that low talent uncertainty is equivalent to a high 
count of players with experience and high talent uncertainty is equivalent to a low count of players with 
experience. Six years is also a natural cutoff point because teams have the rights to players’ contracts for 
this duration. Player turnover is also an important consideration in baseball research (e.g., Glenn, 
McGarrity, & Weller, 2001). Annual Player Turnover is used to demonstrate how many members of the 
team’s 25 man professional roster are replaced annually, a measure of the frequency of player 
transactions for each organization.  
 The next set of independent variables relates to the organization capabilities hypotheses. 
Developmental Capabilities are measured by rankings of organizations’ developmental programs, a 
historically well-studied labor market also known as the minor leagues and farm system (Rottenberg, 
1956). These rankings are an assessment of the stock of talent in an organization’s developmental 
system which is an indirect assessment of an organization’s ability to scout and develop talent. Next, 
prior numbers of acquired players as a predictor of future numbers are measured through Acquisition 
Experience such that the experience and routines of past acquisition numbers will predict future 
acquisition numbers. A three-year lagged moving average is used for the Acquisition Experience 





organizational capabilities and the resource variable, Small-Market Size is reported as a dichotomous 
variable indicating which teams compete in large or small markets. Market size demonstrates resource 
richness and the financial ability to more freely acquire talented players in the marketplace; it is often 
comprised of items such as metropolitan statistical area population or media revenue (see Schmidt & 
Berri, 2002 for a more complete listing). The market size measure for this study was selected from 
Bleacher Report, a reputable source for sports statistics in business research (e.g., Harrington, 2014). For 
robustness, this list was also compared to the competitive balance lottery which gives priority to the 10 
smallest market and 10 lowest revenue teams provided by MLB.com. The separate lists were in 
agreement in approximately 93% of cases and when competitive balance was used as a replacement for 
Small-Market Size, significant/non-significant results did not change. 
  Buy as Predicted is derived from the Number Acquired variable to test the alignment hypothesis. 
This alignment based variable represents the residuals from the equation used to predict Number 
Acquired (observed Number Acquired minus the predicted Number Acquired). Two groups are created. 
The cut-off point is one standard deviation from the mean such that approximately two-thirds of the 
teams fell within the Buy as Predicted category and one-third in the misaligned category (further 
rationale for categorization is presented in the methodology and results). Buying too much or too little 
based on organizational characteristics represents misalignment and thus forms the excluded category. 
This is consistent with organizational alignment studies that align governance to improve performance 
(e.g., Sampson, 2004). 
Dependent Variables 
 The Number Acquired is an endogenous variable in the model. This number is the outcome of 
the five make/buy antecedents yet is secondarily an antecedent to competitive advantage and a direct 





full seasons in a club’s developmental system, they are considered “made” players. Otherwise if players 
are acquired through trade or through free agency they are considered “bought” or “acquired” players. 
There are two remaining dependent variables: Revenue and Average Attendance for which Team Wins 
(and Made Playoffs) is a mediating variable. Firstly, Team Wins is a count of the number of games a 
team wins in the 162 game regular season. Using Team Wins based on the entire season rather than the 
post-season outcome is appropriate since organizational capabilities actually account for a low 
percentage of post-season success (Lewis, Lock, & Sexton, 2009). Made Playoffs signifies whether a 
team is one of eight teams that advanced to post-season play. Both Team Wins and Made Playoffs are 
measures of competitive advantage as both variables measure a team’s success directly compared to the 
competition. Revenue and Average Attendance are measures of financial performance. Revenue is a 
team’s annual revenue and is made up of items such as sponsorships, real estate, ticket sales, and 
concessions (Forbes, 2013; Schwartz, 2013). Average Attendance at home games is a more direct proxy 
for ticket sales and is a commonly studied and cited outcome in sports research (e.g., Baade & Tiehen, 
1990). An additional consideration when selecting the sample years was the time frame. The time period 
used for this study provides relative consistency for attendance, excluding the 1994-1995 strike among 
other things (Nesbit & Kerry, 2012).6 An overview of the variables and predicted coefficient directions 
in association with the theoretical model are displayed below in Figure 2. 
Control Variables 
 Control variables are used in both analyses. Control variables were chosen selectively and more 
conservatively in accordance with research that suggests ambiguous or less meaningful controls 
confound interpretations of findings (Carlson & Wu, 2011). I begin by discussing the controls used in 
Study 1 to examine the antecedents of the make versus buy decision. Changes in ownership (Ownership 
                                                          
6 Other attendance drivers include events such as the 1998 McGuire-Sosa homerun race, Cal Ripken 



















Note The theoretical framework is in black text and the variables are in grey text. 
*Residual analysis to determine if firms buy more or less than predicted.    
Figure 2. The Theoretical Model Including Variables 
 
Change) and top management (General Manager Change) are included to account for the possible 
effects that new top management has on organizational decisions related to the acquisition of players 







































preferences, decision making, and networks (Hersch & Pelkowski, 2012; Rosentraub, 2000). These 
variables account for leadership change for three years after a change occurs because it takes time for 
new strategies to develop and for major roster changes to come to fruition. 
 Next I describe the controls used in the performance analyses (i.e., Team Wins and Made 
Playoffs; Revenue and Average Attendance). Team Salary and Number of All-Stars are separate proxies 
for roster quality. Team Salary is an aggregate of all players’ salaries on the 25 player roster for each 
season. While multiple studies have shown salary compression enhances performance (Bloom, 1999; 
Jane, 2010), I’m interested in understanding whether total salary spending impacts performance 
outcomes. Number of All-Stars is the number of players on the team’s 25-man professional roster who 
were selected to play in the All-Star game. With approximately 750 players on all professional rosters 
(i.e., 30 teams * 25 players), getting selected as one of the ~80 players who make the All Star game 
demonstrates top talent and is therefore an appropriate proxy for quality (Foster & Washington, 2009). 
Additionally, new stadiums should drive performance outcomes, particularly Revenue and Average 
Attendance, as fans are drawn to the new and presumably improved facilities. This novelty effect lasts 
up to eight years in baseball but is particularly strong during the first few seasons (Coates & Humphreys, 
2005). Lastly, in recognizing the endogeneity of Number Acquired in the theoretical model, the 
antecedents from Study 1 are included as controls for the analyses of performance outcomes. However, 
because these controls are likely more applicable for the current year, they are not lagged in the 
performance equations as they are in Study 1. Of the variables from Study 1, Small-Market Size may be 
of particular importance. Although some studies show Small-Market Size does not impact wins, it does 
have an impact on revenue (e.g., Gustafson & Hadley, 2007). Additionally, in Study 1, Professional 
Experience is viewed positively (i.e., reducing talent uncertainty); however, older players are often 





Descriptive Statistics: Major League Baseball, 2002-2011 
 Before formally testing the hypotheses, I will briefly describe data used in subsequent analyses. 
Table 3 shows descriptive data by team for each variable used in Study 1. The teams are sorted in 
descending order on mean Number Acquired, which is the central focus of my dissertation. The mean 
Number Acquired for teams was 16.5 of 25 players on the professional roster. The highest mean Number 
Acquired was nearly 20 players for the Chicago White Sox, whereas an intra-division rival, the 
Minnesota Twins, had the lowest at 11.7 players.  Interestingly, all but two teams, the California Angels 
and the Minnesota Twins, averaged more acquired players (13+) than made players on their 25 man 
professional rosters. Also, somewhat surprising for baseball fans, the New York Yankees, arguably the 
poster child for free agent spending, had a mean Number Acquired of 15.8, placing them among the 10 
lowest of the 30 MLB teams. It may be that the Yankees’ reputation as a buyer in the free agent market 
reflects their high profile talent acquisitions rather than the number of such acquisitions.  
 Comparing the teams mean Number Acquired with data on the antecedent variables used in 
Study 1 also yields some interesting patterns. As one would expect, the mean Number Acquired 
corresponds closely to the mean Acquisition Experience, but differences between the two measures 
suggest teams do change strategies over time. Regarding mean Professional Experience, some 
organizations averaged very few players with six or more years of professional experience such as the 
Tampa Bay Rays (an average of 4.9 of 25 players), while other organizations prefer more experienced 
rosters like the Boston Red Sox (16.1 of 25) and New York Yankees (17.7 of 25). The data show that 
only three of the top ten teams in mean Number Acquired have single digit mean Professional 
Experience, while seven of the bottom ten teams in mean Number Acquired have single digit mean 
Professional Experience, suggesting that having more acquired players results in a more experienced 





among the highest in mean Annual Player Turnover and likewise teams low in mean Number Acquired 
tend to have low mean Annual Player Turnover. To my surprise, on average, teams turned over nearly 
half of their rosters each year (11.6 of 25 players on average).  
Regarding mean Developmental Ranking, a couple of teams like the Tampa Bay Rays and 
Atlanta Braves stood out as having very good player development systems, with average rankings of 6.2 
and 6.6 respectively. At the other end were the Houston Astros with a mean Developmental Ranking of 
23.4 and the St. Louis Cardinals with a mean Developmental Ranking of 23.7. Although casual baseball 
fans may not be surprised by the Rays, Braves, and Astros, the Cardinals are now often lauded for their 
outstanding minor league system. This reflects a change in organizational strategy that occurred nearly 
ten years ago. In fact, “from 2005 to 2011, no team in the majors had as many drafted players contribute 
at the major-league level as the Cardinals” (Goold, 2013, para. 11).7 In general, the data appear to 
suggest that teams with better player development systems (i.e., lower mean = higher rank) also have 
averaged fewer acquired players.  
As for market size, there is not much difference between the numbers of large market teams at 
the top or bottom of the distribution on mean Number Acquired; seven of the top 10 teams in mean 
Number Acquired are in large markets and six of the bottom 10 teams are in large markets. In contrast, 
only two of 10 teams in the middle of the distribution are in large markets, suggesting that large market 
teams may be more likely to choose one strategy when making their make versus buy decisions. 
 Table 4 provides a comparison of teams across each of the dependent variables used in the 
analyses for Study 2. These data also reveal some notable differences. Although a discernable pattern 
between mean Number Acquired and mean Team Wins is not immediately apparent in the data, 
collectively the 12 teams below the mean Number Acquired accounted for more playoff appearances 
                                                          
7 Through the efforts of Branch Rickey, the St. Louis Cardinals are also credited with inventing the farm 





(41) than the remaining 18 teams (36). Not surprising, teams with better performance on the field (i.e., 
Team Wins and playoff appearances) tended to be among the top teams in average home attendance. The 
top five winningest teams were the New York Yankees, Boston Red Sox, California Angels, St. Louis 
Cardinals, and Philadelphia Phillies, while the poorest performing teams were the Kansas City Royals, 
Pittsburgh Pirates, Baltimore Orioles, Washington Nationals, and Tampa Bay Rays. As expected, 
number of playoff appearances generally mimics Team Wins although there are some cases where even 
the difference in a couple average Team Wins determines quite a difference in number of playoff 
appearances (e.g., the Minnesota Twins averaged only two more Team Wins than the Chicago White 
Sox yet made the playoffs three times as often). The New York Yankees which were below the mean 
Number Acquired for 2002-2011 had the highest number of wins, most playoff appearances, highest 
average revenue, and highest average home attendance. Lastly, Average Attendance is impacted by the 
number of seats each stadium holds. For example, it is well known that the Boston Red Sox sell out 
almost (if not) every game yet their attendance only ranks as number nine as their stadium is older and 
holds fewer fans. It is clear that the demand is high, however, since the ticket prices are more expensive 




































White Sox 12.2 (9) 10.8 (23) 19.1 (24) 16.2 (10) 0 19.7 (1) 
Padres 10.9 (11) 13.8 (2) 20.4 (26) 17.6 (3) 1 19.5 (2) 
Red Sox 16.1 (2) 10.6 (25) 15.3 (14) 18.2 (1) 0 19 (3) 
Mets 14.6 (4) 13.1 (4) 20 (25) 17.8 (2) 0 18.3 (4) 
Rangers 8.3 (24) 13.4 (3) 12.4 (8) 17.1 (5) 0 18.2 (5) 
Dodgers 13 (8) 12.9 (5) 11.2 (6) 17.3 (4) 0 18.1 (6) 
Marlins 7.6 (27) 12.5 (8) 12 (7) 14.5 (22) 1 17.9 (7) 
Brewers 10.6 (14) 12.7 (6) 13.2 (11) 16.2 (10) 1 17.8 (8) 
Expos-
Nationals 10 (16) 13.9 (1) 22.3 (28) 14.8 (20) 0 17.8 (8) 
Orioles 9 (21) 12 (12) 18.4 (22) 17 (6) 1 17.8 (8) 
Cardinals 14.7 (3) 10.6 (25) 23.7 (30) 16.5 (9) 1 17.6 (11) 
Indians 8 (25) 11.4 (20) 8.9 (4) 16.9 (7) 1 17.2 (12) 
Reds 11.2 (10) 11 (22) 16.9 (18) 15 (18) 1 17.1 (13) 
Athletics 7.7 (26) 11.8 (14) 17 (19) 15.2 (15) 1 17 (14) 
Tigers 10.3 (15) 11.7 (15) 21.5 (27) 15.1 (17) 0 16.8 (15) 
Mariners 10.9 (11) 11.6 (17) 15.1 (13) 15.9 (12) 1 16.6 (16) 
Rays 4.9 (30) 12.4 (9) 6.2 (1) 15 (18) 1 16.6 (16) 
Cubs 14.1 (5) 11.5 (18) 12.9 (9) 16.7 (8) 0 16.5 (18) 
Giants 14 (6) 11.7 (15) 15.7 (15) 15.5 (14) 0 16.3 (19) 
Royals 9.2 (20) 12.4 (9) 18 (21) 14.1 (24) 1 15.8 (20) 
Yankees 17.7 (1) 10.8 (23) 14.2 (12) 15.8 (13) 0 15.8 (20) 
Phillies 13.7 (7) 9.4 (28) 16.4 (17) 13.9 (25) 0 15.5 (22) 
Pirates 7.3 (29) 12 (12) 18.5 (23) 13.7 (27) 1 15.5 (22) 
Diamondbacks 9.4 (17) 12.6 (7) 17 (19) 15.2 (15) 1 15 (24) 
Astros 9.3 (19) 10.4 (27) 23.4 (29) 14.2 (23) 0 14.9 (25) 
Blue Jays 7.4 (28) 11.3 (21) 16 (16) 13.8 (26) 0 14.9 (25) 
Braves 10.8 (13) 12.2 (11) 6.6 (2) 14.7 (21) 0 14.2 (27) 
Rockies 8.9 (22) 11.5 (18) 12.9 (9) 13.3 (28) 1 13.5 (28) 
Angels 9.4 (17) 8.3 (29) 11.1 (5) 11.5 (29) 0 11.7 (29) 
Twins 8.5 (23) 8.1 (30) 8.8 (3) 10.7 (30) 1 11.7 (29) 
























White Sox 19.7 (1) 84.6 (10) 2 174 (13) 27,852 (20) 
Padres 19.5 (2) 77.5 (20) 2 157 (21) 29,886 (15) 
Red Sox 19 (3) 93.2 (2) 6 238 (2) 36,015 (9) 
Mets 18.3 (4) 79.5 (17) 1 213 (3) 37,223 (8) 
Rangers 18.2 (5) 81.8 (12) 2 170 (14) 29,720 (16) 
Dodgers 18.1 (6) 85.2 (8) 4 209 (5) 43,168 (2) 
Marlins 17.9 (7) 80.8 (13) 1 135 (29) 17,599 (30) 
Brewers 17.8 (8) 77.3 (21) 2 152 (23) 30,989 (13) 
Expos-
Nationals 17.8 (8) 72.5 (27) 0 160 (20) 21,475 (27) 
Orioles 17.8 (8) 69.6 (28) 0 165 (17) 27,595 (21) 
Cardinals 17.6 (11) 90.1 (4) 6 184 (8) 40,345 (3) 
Indians 17.2 (12) 78.4 (19) 1 164 (18) 24,381 (23) 
Reds 17.1 (13) 77 (22) 1 153 (22) 25,602 (22) 
Athletics 17 (14) 85.2 (9) 3 144 (26) 22,919 (25) 
Tigers 16.8 (15) 76 (24) 2 166 (16) 28,906 (19) 
Mariners 16.6 (16) 75.8 (25) 0 183 (9) 32,267 (11) 
Rays 16.6 (16) 75 (26) 3 141 (27) 17,769 (29) 
Cubs 16.5 (18) 80 (15) 3 210 (4) 38,405 (6) 
Giants 16.3 (19) 84.6 (10) 3 183 (9) 38,837 (5) 
Royals 15.8 (20) 66.8 (30) 0 135 (29) 19,935 (28) 
Yankees 15.8 (20) 97.5 (1) 9 343 (1) 47,949 (1) 
Phillies 15.5 (22) 89.8 (5) 5 196 (6) 37,314 (7) 
Pirates 15.5 (22) 67.9 (29) 0 138 (28) 21,686 (26) 
Diamondbacks 15 (24) 78.7 (18) 3 163 (19) 29,386 (17) 
Astros 14.9 (25) 79.9 (16) 2 179 (12) 32,889 (10) 
Blue Jays 14.9 (25) 80.8 (13) 0 150 (25) 24,362 (24) 
Braves 14.2 (27) 88.9 (6) 5 183 (9) 31,081 (12) 
Rockies 13.5 (28) 77 (22) 2 170 (14) 30,898 (14) 
Angels 11.7 (29) 90.9 (3) 6 189 (7) 39,399 (4) 
Twins 11.7 (29) 86.6 (7) 6 151 (24) 28,985 (18) 
Total Averages 16.5 81 2.7 177 30,495 
 
 Similarly, Table 5 summarizes data for the control variables. Regarding management and 





(18). No organization had more than one change in ownership during the 10 year duration. However, a 
number of teams had three or four changes in general manager (i.e., Chicago Cubs, Arizona  

















Angels 1 1 2.4 (12) 101.8 (6) 0 
Astros 1 2 1.9 (21) 82.2 (14) 0 
Athletics 1 0 1.6 (25) 57.5 (24) 0 
Blue Jays 0 2 2.1 (16) 68.1 (18) 0 
Braves 1 1 3.3 (3) 92.4 (8) 0 
Brewers 1 1 2.7 (7) 61.5 (22) 0 
Cardinals 0 1 3.3 (3) 90 (11) 1 
Cubs 1 3 2.2 (14) 105.2 (4) 0 
Diamondbacks 1 3 2 (20) 68.2 (17) 0 
Dodgers 0 2 2.6 (9) 100.2 (7) 0 
Expos-
Nationals 1 3 1.2 (30) 52.1 (27) 1 
Giants 1 0 2.1 (16) 89 (12) 0 
Indians 0 1 1.9 (21) 59.2 (23) 0 
Mariners 0 3 2.1 (16) 92.1 (9) 0 
Marlins 0 2 2.3 (13) 41.1 (29) 0 
Mets 1 3 2.7 (7) 116.7 (3) 1 
Orioles 0 3 1.3 (29) 72.7 (16) 0 
Padres 0 1 1.4 (26) 53.4 (25) 1 
Phillies 0 2 3 (6) 102.1 (5) 1 
Pirates 1 1 1.4 (26) 43 (28) 0 
Rangers 1 1 3.2 (5) 74 (15) 0 
Rays 1 1 2.1 (16) 39.3 (30) 0 
Reds 1 3 1.9 (21) 63.8 (21) 1 
Red Sox 1 4 5.1 (1) 130.2 (2) 0 
Rockies 1 0 1.7 (24) 65 (20) 0 
Royals 0 1 1.4 (26) 52.3 (26) 0 
Tigers 0 1 2.6 (9) 87.9 (13) 0 
Twins 1 2 2.2 (14) 67.3 (19) 1 
White Sox 0 0 2.5 (11) 91 (10) 0 
Yankees 1 0 5.1 (1) 187.5 (1) 1 






Diamondbacks, Washington Nationals, Seattle Mariners, New York Mets, Baltimore Orioles, Cincinnati 
Reds, and Boston Red Sox). To my surprise, general manager turnover only occurred in approximately 
22 percent of ownership changes. Mean Number of All-Stars varies from just over the minimum, which 
is 1 per team, up to 5.1 (i.e., for both the Boston Red Sox and New York Yankees). All but four teams 
fall between 1.4 and 3.3 average players selected for the All-Star game. Eighty million dollars was the 
average Team Salary during the 2002-2011. However, the New York Yankees averaged 187.5 million 
dollars for player payroll, more than 50 million dollars more than any other organization. Five other 
organizations averaged greater than 100 million dollars in annual payrolls, and nine organizations 
operated with payrolls under 60 million dollars, demonstrating an obvious disparity in payroll spending. 
Finally, eight MLB teams built new stadiums from 2002-2011, but none built more than one.    
Finally, descriptive statistics and correlations for all variables used in the analyses are provided in 
Tables 6 and 7. There were no missing data and all variable means, standard deviations, minimum and 
maximum values passed inspection. The variance inflation factor (VIF) scores range from 
approximately 6-13, and 10 is often the upper end of the recommended threshold. Exceeding 10 reveals 
greater multicollinearity, which can reduce the overall r-squared, confound estimation of the regression 
coefficients as well as negatively impact statistical significance test of the coefficients (Hair, Black, 
Babin, & Anderson, 2010). However, for equations that exceed VIF scores of 10, these can generally be 
ignored for three reasons: high VIF scores in the controls (e.g., Team Salary), high VIF scores due to the 
inclusion of powers (i.e., Number Acquired Squared), and when high VIF scores are dummy variables 
with three or more categories (i.e., 29 team dummy variables) (Allison, 2012). These considerations 





Table 6. Descriptive Statistics and Correlations for Study 1 
  Mean SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1. Number Acquired 16.48 2.95 1 
      
  
2. Professional Experience 10.66 3.81 0.19** 1        
    
  
3. Annual Player Turnover 12.05 3.59 0.28** -0.10^ 1 
    
  
4. Developmental Ranking 15.5 8.67 0.22** 0.20** -0.04 1 
   
  
5. Acquisition Experience 16.76 2.7 0.65** 0.32** 0.30** 0.08 1 
  
  
7. Small-Market Size 0.5 0.5 -0.01 -0.36** 0.05 -0.04 0.06 1 
 
  
8. Ownership Change 0.17 0.38 -0.10^ -0.05 0.04 0.02 -0.05 -0.03 1   
9. General Manager Change 0.39 0.49 0.12* -0.08 0.13 0.07 0.03 -0.03 0.11* 1 
N = 300 






Table 7. Descriptive Statistics and Correlations for Study 2 
 Mean SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
1. Revenue+ 170.9 52.9 1 
           2. Average 
Attendance 30495 8735 .64** 1 
          
3. Team Wins 81 11.6 .33** .51** 1 
         4. Number 
Acquired 16.47 2.95 -.10* -.03 -.06 1 
        5. Professional 
Experience 10.66 3.81 .39** .65** .42** .30** 1 
       6. Annual Player 
Turnover 12.05 3.59 -.18 -.30** -.19** .27** -.17** 1 
      7. Developmental 
Ranking 15.5 8.67 .02 .06 -.05 .18** .20** .02 1 
     8. Acquisition 
Experience 16.76 2.7 .02 .06 -.12* .65** .28** .19** .05 1 
    9. Small-Market 
Size .5 .5 -.38** -.44** -.29** -.01 -.38** .16** -.04 .06 1 
   10. Number of 
All-Stars 2.36 1.6 .43** .42** .60** .07 .34** -.23** -.05 .01 -.27** 1 
  
11. Team Salary+ 80.23 34.73 .82** .76** .42** -.067 .63** -.26** .09 .02 -.53 .45** 1 
 
13. New Stadium .08 .27 .24** .16** -.02 .00 .15* -.06 .14* .07 -.01 .02 .17 1 
N = 300 
+ in Millions of Dollars (USD) 





Looking first at the variables used in the analyses for Number Acquired (Study 1) Table 6 shows several 
significant correlations for the hypothesized relationships. As predicted, Developmental Ranking and 
Acquisition Experience are positively and significantly correlated with Number Acquired. But two 
correlations are in the opposite direction of what was hypothesized. Professional Experience and Annual 
Player Turnover are both significantly correlated with Number Acquired yet they are both positive rather 
than negative as predicted. Perhaps the presence of more experienced players on a team reflects the 
organization’s desire to choose experience over youth, thus leading to more player acquisitions through 
free agency and trades. And it is possible that organizations must seek the market when experiencing 
turnover rather than rely on the developmental system. Small-Market Size was not significantly 
correlated with Number Acquired, though the relationship is negative as hypothesized. Significant 
correlations are observed between Ownership Change and Number Acquired (negative) and between 
General Manager Change and Number Acquired (positive).  
 Table 7 shows correlations for variables used in the analyses of performance outcomes that 
comprise Study 2. Starting with the relationships among the three dependent variables in the analyses 
(Team Wins, Average Attendance, and Revenue) we see that Team Wins is positively and significantly 
correlated with both Revenue and Average Attendance, suggesting that success on the field improves 
organizational performance. When examining the relationships between the antecedent/control variables 
and the three dependent variables that are the focus of Study 2, Table 7 shows the relationships to be 
very similar across the dependent variables. For example, Professional Experience, Number of All-Stars, 
and Team Salary are all positively and significantly correlated with Team Wins, Revenue, and Average 
Attendance; and Annual Player Turnover and Small-Market Size are both negatively and significantly 
correlated with Team Wins, Revenue, and Average Attendance. There were however a few unique 





Experience is significantly correlated (negative) only with Team Wins; and New Stadium is significantly 
correlated with Revenue and Average Attendance (both positive) but not Team Wins. 
Methodology 
 The methodological design for both studies is as follows. The make versus buy decision is 
operationalized as a continuous rather than discrete variable. This contrasts with other research that 
treats the make-buy-concurrent sourcing decision as trichotomous (Parmigiani, 2007). Therefore, I test 
the make versus buy decision through regression rather than multinomial logistic regression to allow the 
endogenous Number Acquired to more freely vary. Analyzing the make versus buy decision in this 
manner allows for the possibility that organizations that make 79% could be significantly different than 
those that buy 79%, rather than treating these outcomes as equivalent examples of concurrent sourcing, 
an idea more recent studies are beginning to consider (e.g., Sako, Chondrakis, & Vaaler, 2013).  
 To test the theoretical model illustrated in Figure 1, I first examine the antecedents of Number 
Acquired. Then, for Study 2, I examine how Number Acquired affects Revenue and Average Attendance 
through the mediating variable, Team Wins. Regarding the latter, a separate analysis is also conducted to 
test the organizational alignment hypothesis (i.e., H3a). Although the theoretical model shows Number 
Acquired as a mediating variable between the antecedents of the sourcing decision and competitive 
advantage, I am not hypothesizing this as a mediation model for Study 1. Rather I seek to examine 
factors affecting the sourcing decision and how that decision subsequently affects performance 
outcomes through Team Wins. Due to the obvious endogeneity of Number Acquired for the analyses of 
performance outcomes, I include the five antecedent variables (i.e., Professional Experience, Annual 
Player Turnover, Developmental Capabilities, Acquisition Experience, and Small-Market Size) when 





 For Study 1, a regression model is used to determine which antecedents significantly impact 
Number Acquired (see Table 8, Study 1). To test Study 2, organizational alignment is tested using the 
residuals from the Number Acquired equation, the TMGT effect using Number Acquired and its squared 
term in the regression analysis, and mediation models are used to determine the impact of Number 
Acquired on Revenue and Average Attendance through Team Wins. Mediation occurs when the effect on 
a dependent variable (Y) is explained by an intervening variable (M), rather than directly by the 
independent variables (X) (Schurer-Lambert, 2013). To provide results for Study 2, I use a simple 
mediation model (Bedeian, 2012; Hayes, 2013) tested with panel data (Cole & Maxwell, 2003).  
 Baron and Kenny (1986) suggest a 3-step procedure to test mediation, regressing the dependent 
variable on the predictor, regressing the mediator variable on the predictor, and regressing the dependent 
variable on both the mediator and the predictors (Taylor, 2010). While this technique has drawn some 
criticism (see Hayes, 2013: 167-170), a 3-step regression analysis is appropriate for testing the 
hypothesized relationships in this study and provides the most straightforward and robust analysis. 
Mediation “specifies the existence of a significant intervening mechanism between an antecedent 
variable and a consequent variable” (Venkatraman, 1989, p. 428). Hence, to test the model for Study 2, I 
use a three stage regression analysis to predict how Number Acquired directly impacts Revenue and 
Average Attendance, how Number Acquired impacts Team Wins, and finally to predict how Number 
Acquired impacts Revenue and Average Attendance through Team Wins (see Table 8, Study 2). If the 
direct effect is reduced yet still significant, there is partial mediation, and if the direct effect is no longer 
significant, there is full mediation (Hair et al, 2010). Reference to Zhao, Lynch, and Chen’s (2010) 
decision tree also clarifies the type of mediation present (i.e., complementary, competitive, indirect, 





 In addition to Figure 1, to test the organizational alignment hypothesis, I use the residuals from 
the Number Acquired regression analysis to group teams into two categories: Buy As Predicted and 
High/Low Buy; Buy as Predicted teams more closely follow what is expected, that is near zero residuals 
of the observed Number Acquired minus predicted Number Acquired; and High/Low Buy teams pursue 
more of an acquiring/developing strategy (i.e., identified by positive/negative residuals of the observed 
minus predicted). The residuals for each organization provide evidence to determine which teams 
acquire more (or fewer) players than expected. This test allows me to determine if alignment, Buy as 
Predicted, leads to better performance than misalignment, High/Low Buy. To perform the analysis, 
High/Low Buy is the excluded category (see Table 8, alignment hypothesis). Various methods of 
creating these groupings were considered and ultimately the most objective choice seemed to be using 
one standard deviation from the mean to categorize teams as High/Low Buy, and within one standard 
deviation from the mean to represent Buy as Predicted.  
 As mentioned, to conduct the above analyses I use regression and include the appropriate control 
variables as described above. There are three remaining methodological issues to address not previously 
mentioned. First, when estimating the equation for Number Acquired, all antecedents are lagged one 
year because roster composition is likely determined by factors and decisions that precede the start of 
the baseball season. However, although the outcomes of decisions about Number Acquired will not 
likely be observed until the following season, the same antecedents are not lagged when used as control 
variables for Study 2 since they may have an immediate impact on performance. To maintain a sample 
of 300 observations, additional data were collected for the lagged years.  
 Secondly, there are some issues to consider related to my data. I have collected archival data for 
each MLB team for every year from 2002 to 2011. These panel data are strongly balanced, meaning 





least squares (OLS) regression are normality, homoscedasticity, linearity, and an absence of correlated 
errors (Hair et al, 2010). Panel data however creates problems for these standard assumptions as the 
organizations are not independent of one another from year to year, therefore violating homoscedasticity 
and correlated errors assumptions.  
There are several estimation techniques available when analyzing panel data, including fixed-
effects models and random effects models. Random effects models assume that the specific effects of 
the independent variables are uncorrelated. “If you have reason to believe that differences across entities 
have some influence on your dependent variable then you should use random effects” (Torres-Reyna, 
2014, p. 25). On the other hand, fixed effects models explore the relationship between independent and 
dependent variables within an entity and are best used when the impact of variables that vary over time 
are not the result of random variation. Because organizations do not vary in completely random ways 
from year to year, a fixed effects model is more logical for this dataset. Furthermore, I have all the teams 
and all levels rather than a sample of possible levels; this too conceptually supports the fixed effects 
model. In addition, statistical tests are also available to help determine whether fixed or random effects 
models are more suitable. To best determine which model to use, Stata offers a Hausman test to 
determine whether errors are correlated with regressors. The Hausman test treats random effects as the 
null hypothesis and fixed effects as the alternative hypothesis. If the probability of chi-squared is 
significant (p < 0.05), the fixed effects model is appropriate. “It basically tests whether the unique errors 
are correlated with the regressors, the null hypothesis is they are not” (Torres-Reyna, 2014, p. 29). Since 
my results for the Hausman test are significant, I estimate the models using fixed effects.   
 Two common options for estimating fixed effects models to account for problems inherent in the 
use of panel data are Least Squares Dummy Variables (LSDV) and Panel Corrected Standard Errors 





problems in the panel. Accordingly, I estimate pooled organization models using panel corrected 
standard errors (PCSE) (Garand, 2010), a function available in STATA’s data analysis software package 
(i.e., “xtpcse variables, corr(psar1) hetonly”). Essentially, the estimates of β will be consistent but the 
standard errors will be inaccurate. Hence this function “takes into account the contemporaneous  
Table 8. Empirical Equations 
Study 1: Number Acquired 
Regress the DV on the IVs 
Number Acquired = α + y ∑ Controls + β11 Professional Experience + β12 Annual Turnover + β13 
Developmental Ranking + β14 Acquisition Experience + β15 Small-Market Size + ε2 
 
Study 2: Alignment Hypothesis 
Team Wins = α + y ∑ Controls + β11 Buy as Predicted + ε1 
 
Study 2: TMGT Hypothesis 
Team Wins = α + y ∑ Controls + β11 Number Acquired + β12 Number Acquired
2 + ε2 
 
Study 2: Revenue mediating equations: 
Step 1: Regress the DV on the IVs 
Revenue = α + y ∑ Controls + β11 Number Acquired + β12 Number Acquired
2 + ε1 
 
Step 2: Regress the mediator on the IVs 
Team Wins = α + y ∑ Controls + β21 Number Acquired + β22 Number Acquired
2 + ε2 
 
Step 3: Regress the DV on both the IVs and the mediator  
Revenue = α + y ∑ Controls + β31 Number Acquired + β32 Team Wins + β33 Number Acquired
2 + ε3 
 
Study 2: Average Attendance mediating equations: 
Step 1: Regress the DV on the IVs 
Average Attendance = α + y ∑ Controls + β11 Number Acquired + β12 Number Acquired
2 + ε1 
 
Step 2: Regress the mediator on the IVs 
Team Wins = α + y ∑ Controls + β21 Number Acquired + β22 Number Acquired
2 + ε2 
 
Step 3: Regress the DV on both the IV and the mediator 
Average Attendance = α + y ∑ Controls + β31 Number Acquired + β32 Team Wins + β33 Number 







correlation of the errors (and perforce heteroscedasticity)” (Beck & Katz, 1995, p. 638) by using the 
residuals to provide a consistent estimate and confirmed through Monte Carlo experiments (Beck & 





CHAPTER V: RESULTS 
Study 1 
 The results for the TCE and organizational capabilities hypotheses are presented in Model 1 of 
Table 9.8 As mentioned, each of the five antecedents is lagged by one year as personnel decisions are 
more likely to take form based on experiences and decisions derived from the previous season. For 
Hypothesis 1a, greater Professional Experience is expected to lead to fewer players acquired; though the 
coefficient for Professional Experience is negative, it is not significant. Accordingly, the results do not 
provide support for hypothesis 1a. Hypothesis 1b predicts that higher levels of Annual Player Turnover 
will lead to a higher number of developed players; the coefficient for this hypothesis is also not 
significant. Hence, neither of the TCE hypotheses are supported. 
 Hypothesis 2a predicts that organizations with better developmental capabilities should adopt a 
strategy emphasizing player acquisition rather than player development. The significant positive 
coefficient for Developmental Ranking (0.05, p < 0.01) supports this hypothesis; the lower a team’s 
developmental system is ranked, the more acquired players they have on their professional rosters. 
Hypothesis 2b predicts that Acquisition Experience positively impacts the number acquired, a prediction 
which the coefficient also significantly supported (0.34, p < 0.01). The final organizational capability 
hypothesis predicts that greater organizational resources will lead to more acquisitions but this 
hypothesis is not supported by the results. So while neither TCE hypotheses are supported, two of the 





                                                          





Table 9. Results from Study 1 Regression Analysis 
  B SE 
Professional Experience -0.05 (0.05) 
Annual Player Turnover 0.03 (0.04) 
Developmental Ranking 0.05** (0.01) 
Acquisition Experience 0.34** (0.07) 
Small-Market Size  -2.13 (1.70) 
Ownership Change -0.51 (0.33) 
General Manager Change 0.50^ (0.27) 
  
  Organization fixed effects Yes 
   
  Observations 300 
 Notes: Column 1 reports coefficients and standard errors (in parentheses) from panel regressions. 
*** p < 0.01. ** p < 0.05. * p < 0.1 
Study 2 
Hypotheses 3a and 3b predict Team Wins. Results of the analysis to examine the alignment hypothesis 
(3a) are presented in Model 1 of Table 10.9 As referenced in the methodology, observations were 
divided into two groups: Buy as Predicted and the misaligned category (e.g., the excluded category). 
The Buy as Predicted group contained a majority of the observations (204) while the misaligned group 
included observations greater or less than one standard deviation from the mean (96 observations). 
Although I predicted more aligned organizations to perform better, the results of the Buy as Predicted 
category were not significant and thus hypothesis 3a was not supported. For robustness, three groups: 
Low Buy, High Buy, and Buy as Predicted were also tested to determine if high or low buy had different 
impacts on misalignment; however this too did not produce significant findings by excluding the Buy as 
Predicted group.  
 
                                                          















  H3a H3b   H4a   H4b 
  B(SE) B(SE) B(SE) B(SE) B(SE) B(SE) 
Number Acquired 
 
-3.27(1.26)** -3.29(3.93) -3.43(3.85) -649.07(577.43) -652.11(553.31) 
Number Acquired 
Squared  .09(.04)* .09(.12) .10(.12) 19.40(17.92) 19.57(17.21) 
Professional Experience 1.01(.18)** 1.05(.19)** -2.68(.56) -3.08(.57)** 346.50(79.92)** 241.28(82.75)** 
Annual Player Turnover -.52(.19)** -.48(.19)* -.40(.54) .44(.53) -165.76(73.92)* -157.07(71.11)* 
Developmental Ranking -.06(.06) -.04(.06) -.07(.18) -.06(.18) -1.50(24.84) -10.78(23.96) 
Acquisition Experience -.53(.24)* -.39(.25) -.62(.75) -.42(.74) 429.02(117.59)** 447.87(118.18)** 
Small-Market Size  -11.7(5.79)* -13.67(4.81)** -63.66(39.00) -64.17(41.15) -1712.07(3906.12) -1207.27(4484.19) 
Number of All-Stars 2.90(.32)** 2.97(.32)** 2.60(.99)** 1.35(1.04) 541.03(123.12)** 258.81(129.58)* 
Total Salary+ -.03(.02) -.05(.02) 1.10(.09)** 1.10(.09)** 85.12(13.69)** 90.31(13.49)** 
New Stadium 
  
20.54(7.41)** 21.04(7.21)** 1347.04(1189.50) 1354.15(1151.71) 
Team Wins 




Buy as Predicted -.08(.92) 
     Organization fixed 
effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 300 300 300 300 300 300 
Notes: Columns 1–6 report coefficients and standard errors (in parentheses) from panel regressions. 
 + in Millions of Dollars (USD) 






Hypothesis 3b predicted Number Acquired (-3.27, p < 0.01) and Number Acquired Squared 
(0.09, p < 0.05) to have a curvilinear impact on competitive advantage (i.e., Team Wins) such that 
Number Acquired would have a positive impact on Team Wins but only to a certain extent eventually 
diminishing as more players are acquired. While the predictors provide significant results, they differ in 
one important respect. Rather than an inverted U relationship, the results show Number Acquired has a 
negative impact on Team Wins but, after a team acquired ~16 players further player acquisition begins to 
have a positive impact. Accordingly, the results support the notion that the relationship between the two 
variables is curvilinear, but as a U rather than inverted U relationship (see Figure 3). 
 
 
Figure 3. The Curvilinear Impact of Number Acquired on Team Wins 
 
Hypotheses 4a and 4b predict that Number Acquired (and Number Acquired Squared) will lead to 
higher Revenue (4a) and higher Average Attendance (4b) through the mediating variable, Team Wins. 
Team Wins is a significant predictor of both Revenue (0.46, p < 0.01) and Average Attendance (109.13, p 





(-6.19, p < 0.05) and Number Acquired Squared (0.19, p < 0.05) are not significant predictors of 
Revenue which according to Baron and Kenny (1986) is a necessary condition for mediation. However, 
more recent research suggests that there are varying types and levels of mediation (Zhou, Lynch, & 
Chen, 2010). Therefore, because Team Wins has a significant impact on Revenue and, in accordance 
with Zhou and colleagues (2010), I conclude Team Wins partially mediates (i.e., indirect-only 
mediation) Number Acquired and Revenue thus providing support for hypothesis 4a.   
Next, for each additional win I find that Average Attendance increases by ~109 people. Although 
the direct effects of Number Acquired (Number Acquired Squared) also do not significantly predict 
Average Attendance, Number Acquired (Number Acquired Squared) significantly predict Team Wins, 
and Team Wins significantly predict Average Attendance (109.13, p < 0.01) which provides indirect-
only mediation and support for hypotheses 4b (Zhou et al, 2010). 
 For robustness, Made Playoffs was used as an alternative to Team Wins in the equations. The 
results reinforce hypothesis 3b as Number Acquired (-0.17, p < 0.05) and Number Acquired Squared 
(0.01, p < 0.05) have a similar impact on Made Playoffs as they did on Team Wins. Moreover, Made 
Playoffs also has similar significant relationships as Team Wins when used as a mediating variable in the 
Revenue equation. However, Made Playoffs did not significantly predict greater Average Attendance.  
 For further robustness the analyses were conducted for sub-samples of MLB. Baseball is broken 
up into two leagues: The American League and the National League.10 The leagues are the same in most 
ways except that the American League has a designated hitter rather than having the pitcher hit. 
However, this does lead to more pinch hitting which in turn leads to more pitching changes in the 
National League. It’s possible this difference influences team behaviors and strategies when developing 
                                                          
10 There are also three divisions within each league generally categorized by geographic location and 
titled the West, Central, and East. However, because the division samples were relatively small (i.e., an 





or acquiring personnel. The National League also had 16 teams whereas the American League had 14 
teams from 2002-2011. This makes it more difficult for National League teams to gain additional 
revenues and attendance by making and playing more games during the playoffs. Hence the leagues 
have some fundamental differences that may alter the effects and therefore I ran the analyses for each 
league to see if the results varied by league. The results of the analyses for the two leagues show a few 
notable differences. Developmental Ranking is significant for only the National League. The curvilinear 
relationship as seen in Figure 3 is significant only for the American League and the impact Team Wins 
has on Revenue is also significant only for the American League. Further considerations about these 
league differences are provided in the discussion section. 
Control Variables 
 Several control variables are significant predictors of Number Acquired in Study 1. Although the 
results of Ownership Change, of which there were 18 in the sample, did not predict Number Acquired, 
General Manager Change leads organizations to more of an acquisition based strategy (0.50, p < 0.10). 
This may reflect a difference between owners, who may be more willing to pursue a long term strategy 
of investing in the team’s developmental program, and general managers who adopt a win now strategy 
perhaps to enhance their own job security. 
In Study 2, a number of controls are also significant predictors. Developmental Ranking and 
Acquisition Experience are significant predictors in the equation testing the alignment hypothesis while 
Professional Experience, Annual Player Turnover, and Small-Market Size are significant predictors in 
the equation testing the TMTG hypothesis demonstrating the importance of controlling for endogeneity 
by including variables from Study 1. Number of All-Stars significantly impact Team Wins when testing 
the alignment (0.20, p < 0.01) and TMGT hypotheses (2.97, p < 0.01). Several control variables also 





Revenue, Professional Experience has a significant, negative impact (-3.08, p < 0.01). Yet Professional 
Experience has a significant, positive impact on Team Wins and on Average Attendance (241.28, p < 
0.01). This negative impact on Revenue could be due to higher labor costs as more experienced players 
earn higher salaries. While Annual Player Turnover does not significantly affect Revenue, it negatively 
impacts Average Attendance (-157.07, p < 0.05). Acquisition Experience positively impacts Average 
Attendance (447.87, p < 0.01). Number of All-Stars positively impacts Average Attendance (258.81, p < 
0.05), a finding most baseball fans might expect. Team Salary positively impacts both Revenue (1.10, p 
< 0.01) and Average Attendance (90.31, p < 0.01). Perhaps this is due to fans’ desire to watch well-
known, high-paid athletes.11 Having a New Stadium positively impacts Revenue (21.04, p < 0.01) but not 
Average Attendance. Finally, as fixed-effects models, 29 organization controls were included (i.e., the 
New York Yankees organization was the excluded category) in the analyses for both studies. These 
results can be examined in Appendix A through E. 
                                                          
11 The natural log of Team Salary also had positive and significant results on the outcomes. The natural 
log transforms Team Salary to account for a wide variation among teams, eliminating undesirable 






CHAPTER VI: DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
 Three fundamental gaps in the literature led to this research. First, concurrent sourcing has 
received a great deal of attention in the past few years yet there still is a lack of clarity as to how, why, 
and at what levels it is advantageous to organizations. Secondly, as much of the developed world has 
moved toward knowledge and service economies, improving our understanding of human capital is 
necessary, particularly in terms of how organizations source and how the decision impacts performance. 
Third, as competitive advantage is fundamental to strategic management, working to more precisely 
know how it impacts financial performance is important to academicians and organizational decision 
makers. Hence, the purpose of this study is to answer three fundamental questions: What factors affect 
organizations’ decisions to source their human capital? How do these decisions impact competitive 
advantage? Does competitive advantage mediate the relationship between sourcing decisions and 
financial outcomes?  
This study advances research on the concurrent sourcing of human capital by applying various 
theoretical perspectives to examine the causes and consequences of sourcing decisions within a labor 
intensive industry. To empirically test these questions, regression and mediated regression using panel 
data were used within the MLB setting. The results indicate that various organizational characteristics 
impact human capital sourcing, that sourcing impacts competitive advantage, and competitive advantage 
mediates the relationship between sourcing and financial outcomes. In conducting this research, I 
contribute to the literature in the following areas as discussed below: TCE and organizational 
capabilities; the TMGT effect and organization alignment; and competitive advantage. This discussion is 
followed by implications for managerial practice, limitations and future research, and the conclusion.  
 This research assesses the usefulness of TCE when applied to sourcing human capital rather than 





organizational capabilities to be a superior predictor of sourcing to TCE in small manufacturing firms. 
Consistent with her findings, organizational capabilities also proved more useful as a predictor of 
sourcing decisions for human capital in MLB. Although the TCE lens was not helpful in determining 
human capital sourcing, talent uncertainty and frequency were useful TCE concepts in addressing 
performance. On the other hand, the organizational capabilities reasoning proved very useful to 
explaining sourcing decisions and in examining performance outcomes. Namely, an organization’s 
developmental capabilities and experience play a critical role in both. In short, I find that in the context 
of sourcing human capital in MLB, organizational capabilities provides superior explanatory power 
relative to TCE.   
 Next, although I failed to find support for the importance of organizational alignment to 
organizational performance, curvilinear effects of sourcing strategies on organizational outcomes appear 
to be an important consideration for human capital scholars. According to the results (i.e., U shape), 
rather than acquiring human capital based on organizations’ characteristics, or balancing their sourcing, 
organizations are better off specializing in either greater internal or external sourcing. Organizations that 
did not specialize, either in a make or a buy strategy, had lower organizational performance (see Figure 
3 for a graphical representation). This graphical representation of the results is notable as one can clearly 
see that varying levels of concurrent sourcing have varying impacts on performance. These results also 
support my belief that concurrent sourcing should not be treated as a dichotomous phenomenon. The U 
shape for this relationship indicates that organizations performed best when they used very little or 
nearly all talent acquisitions rather than balancing. Perhaps specializing in developing human capital 
(i.e., high make) builds team camaraderie and/or tacit knowledge among players. (Berman, Down, & 
Hill, 2002). However, camaraderie doesn’t explain why a greater rather than marginal number of 





sourcing type did not appear helpful, organizations may need to make more of a commitment toward 
one strategy or another in terms of sourcing human capital. There has been a great deal of recent 
emphasis on this meta-theoretical principal (i.e., TMGT effect) and the results of this study provide 
more evidence that scholars should continue to consider the likelihood that many relationships, 
including the acquisition of human capital in sourcing decisions, are actually curvilinear.  
 Finally, this study contributed to the strategic management literature by utilizing a context which 
provides a clear metric for competitive advantage, a very common concept in strategic management that 
often proves difficult to capture empirically. This allowed me to demonstrate how human capital 
sourcing decisions may impact competitive advantage and confirm that competitive advantage positively 
impacts financial performance. The impact that competitive advantage has on financial outcomes further 
establishes the importance of giving continued practical and scholarly attention to this concept. To the 
extent that organizations can establish competitive advantage, their financial outcomes will be superior 
to their competitors. As competitive advantage remains fundamental to strategic management, it is of 
upmost importance that more studies empirically validate a difficult to operationalize construct. 
 There are also implications for managerial practice. Because specializing in vertical integration 
or strategic acquisitions of human capital was most advantageous in terms of organizational outcomes, 
organizations may want to focus heavily on training and development if they desire to pursue vertically 
integrating talent. This might involve expanding the human resources department in terms of training, 
development, recruiting, and so forth. On the other hand, training and development programs may 
represent a loss of resources for partial commitment toward development and vertical integration of 





(Krautmann, Gustafson, & Hadley, 2000). Additionally, management may consider identifying how 
their top employees were sourced to determine whether development or acquisition strategies have been 
more effective. 
Limitations and Future Research 
 Although the contributions of this research are useful to theory and practice, they are not without 
some limitations. First, while the goal was to better explore talent uncertainty and frequency, choosing a 
context with low asset specificity may be an inappropriate way to determine whether TCE or 
organizational capabilities sheds more light on sourcing human capital. Some scholars argue that asset 
specificity is essential to the fundamental ideas of TCE and that without asset specificity, TCE theory is 
less applicable and useful (e.g., Whyte, 1994) and that asset specificity is a necessary condition to use 
the transaction cost lens (David & Han, 2004). In the case of MLB, players develop nearly identical 
skills regardless of the team they play for thus reducing asset specificity. However, teams have contract 
rights of players for six years after players join the professional roster. In that regard, contracts add a 
certain amount of asset specificity and incentivize teams to develop players more precisely for their 
needs during this duration. Accordingly, contract rights provide some asset specificity hence 
diminishing this limitation.  
 Secondly, sporting contexts are excellent when used for appropriate questions (Holcomb et al, 
2009; Wolfe et al, 2005), but MLB still has a few limitations when trying to generalize to other contexts. 
First, smaller-market teams are awarded subsidies from larger-market teams in order to level the playing 
field. This is rarely seen in other industries and is in fact often reported in popular press as just the 
opposite suggesting large corporations get better incentives in lieu of supporting small business. Thus, 
this redistribution of funds is slightly less generalizable to organizational studies. Next, the extremely 





oligopolies, oligopolies do not represent a majority of organizations. In addition, the context also 
resembles industries that have, at one time or another, been highly regulated such as airlines, trucking, 
and telecommunications. However, these industries too have become less regulated over time. 
Ultimately, despite these limitations, MLB is actually a very good context to address these questions for 
a number of reasons. MLB is unlike any of the other major sports in the United States, as it does not 
employ a payroll cap. Because a payroll cap restricts the amount of money teams can spend on human 
capital, selecting a sport without a payroll cap is most relevant to compare to other business 
organizations. The lack of a payroll cap leads to a wide disparity in payrolls among the 30 teams in the 
league and creates an interesting dynamic just as other business organizations greatly vary in size and 
spending. Additionally, the player development structure in MLB is an aspect that is absent from other 
sports in which players are drafted and immediately join the professional roster (e.g., NFL, NHL and 
NBA). In this way, a baseball team’s developmental system is like those found in many organizations 
where managerial talent is through the ranks of the organization (in comparison to arriving through other 
organizations). Public accounting, law firms, and consulting firms act in a similar fashion often having 
5-6 tiers in which employees typically move up or out after a certain duration. In sum, MLB is much 
less (if at all) limiting in making generalizations to organizations for the questions in this study. 
 Regarding future directions for studying human capital sourcing, my hope is that this is a timely 
study incorporating human capital with concurrent sourcing literature as scholars look to better 
understand concurrent sourcing (Parmigiani, 2007) as well as find ways in which human capital leads to 
competitive advantages (Coff & Kryscynski, 2011). In addition to demonstrating ways in which human 
capital enhances organizational performance, other future studies may come from this work. For 
example, governance is often discussed as make, buy, or ally. While ally is not examined in the present 





sourcing and differences between trading for (i.e., relational, cooperation, or ally) and acquiring. 
Researchers could also examine whether teams mimic sourcing ratios of other successful teams that 
have similar characteristics. This may lead to interesting discoveries in institutional theory and 
isomorphism regarding organizations’ strategic decisions and which characteristics organizations are 
most likely to imitate. Another area of further study could look more closely at alignment. While 
organizational alignment has proven relevant in other contexts (e.g., Sampson, 2004), it was 
insignificant in this study. Perhaps scholarship would benefit from more studies pertaining to the 
alignment of human capital to help determine how taking action based on organizational characteristics 
may lead to competitive advantages, maybe utilizing other research methods, such as qualitative 
methods, multilevel studies, or tests in other contexts. A further investigation of league and division 
differences might provide a setting to better understand human capital sourcing differences among 
various strategic groups or clusters within an industry because in this context (i.e., MLB teams compete 
more often with intra-division rivals), as with many industries, organizations’ performance is not only 
dependent on the industry but also largely dependent on the strength of their direct and closest 
competitors within strategic groups (Rothaermel, 2013). Finally more broad considerations could be 
studied determining why certain organizations divested and more specifically by looking at free agent 
rankings within developmental capabilities. 
 At an individual level, ownership and general manager data in MLB is extremely interconnected 
which could further studies on top management team turnover and networks within an industry (e.g., 
Hersch & Pelkowski, 2012). As seen with the control variables, this is an applicable context to study 
owner and top management changes. Further studies could uncover whether owners change due to 
performance, what characteristics cause general managers to migrate from team to team, the impact of 





utilize this context for research in the recruiting literature as each MLB team has teams of recruiters and 
scouts trying to identify talented personnel.  
In conclusion, human capital and concurrent sourcing have received a great deal of attention in 
the strategic management literature. This study helps integrate the two areas and provide useful 
explanations as to how organizations source their talent and how these sourcing decisions drive 
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ANTECEDENTS OF PLAYER ACQUISITION: 
RESULTS FROM STUDY 1 REGRESSION ANALYSIS 
 
                                                                               
        rhos =  .6062463 -.0603922  -.128052 -.1504872   .153926 ...   .390682
                                                                              
       _cons     10.26832   1.549967     6.62   0.000     7.230439     13.3062
    WhiteSox     2.730706   1.036431     2.63   0.008     .6993393    4.762073
       Twins    -.8229471   1.627399    -0.51   0.613    -4.012591    2.366697
      Tigers    -.4271245   1.402307    -0.30   0.761    -3.175596    2.321347
      Royals     1.244533   1.702553     0.73   0.465    -2.092411    4.581476
     Rockies    (dropped)
      RedSox     1.420696   1.208299     1.18   0.240    -.9475262    3.788919
        Reds     1.229741   2.407786     0.51   0.610    -3.489434    5.948916
        Rays     1.877344   1.541077     1.22   0.223    -1.143112      4.8978
     Rangers     1.293072   1.221266     1.06   0.290    -1.100564    3.686709
     Pirates     1.308763   1.807268     0.72   0.469    -2.233417    4.850943
    Phillies    -.7535079   1.071194    -0.70   0.482     -2.85301    1.345995
      Padres     3.257879    1.64276     1.98   0.047     .0381291    6.477629
     Orioles     2.302959   1.490697     1.54   0.122    -.6187537    5.224671
        Mets     .5476674   1.312615     0.42   0.677    -2.025011    3.120345
     Marlins     2.789522   1.513617     1.84   0.065    -.1771115    5.756156
    Mariners      2.04725   1.617462     1.27   0.206    -1.122917    5.217416
     Indians     2.763854   1.765489     1.57   0.117    -.6964407    6.224148
      Giants     .1673244   1.285174     0.13   0.896    -2.351571     2.68622
ExposNatio~s     .2625544   1.313363     0.20   0.842    -2.311591    2.836699
     Dodgers     1.368793   1.432853     0.96   0.339    -1.439546    4.177133
Diamondbacks     .5768595   1.510827     0.38   0.703    -2.384306    3.538025
        Cubs    -1.040537   2.983124    -0.35   0.727    -6.887351    4.806278
   Cardinals     1.119549   2.996036     0.37   0.709    -4.752574    6.991673
     Brewers     3.000865   1.539957     1.95   0.051    -.0173951    6.019124
      Braves     -.944145   1.258514    -0.75   0.453    -3.410787    1.522497
    BlueJays    -1.527017   1.067268    -1.43   0.152    -3.618824    .5647892
   Athletics     2.681008   1.452552     1.85   0.065    -.1659423    5.527959
      Astros    -1.318457   1.215641    -1.08   0.278    -3.701069    1.064155
      Angels    -3.094139   1.350397    -2.29   0.022    -5.740868   -.4474095
GeneralMan~e     .5039239   .2731152     1.85   0.065     -.031372     1.03922
OwnershipC~e    -.5135978   .3275394    -1.57   0.117    -1.155563    .1283677
SmallMarke~e    -2.132099   1.701431    -1.25   0.210    -5.466843    1.202645
Acquisitio~e     .3443991   .0732396     4.70   0.000     .2008521     .487946
Developmen~g     .0482845    .014137     3.42   0.001     .0205765    .0759926
AnnualPlay~g     .0249912   .0434773     0.57   0.565    -.0602228    .1102052
Profession~g    -.0513468   .0449293    -1.14   0.253    -.1394067    .0367131
                                                                              
NumberAcqu~d        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                          Het-corrected
                                                                              
Estimated coefficients     =        36          Prob > chi2        =    0.0000
Estimated autocorrelations =        30          Wald chi2(35)      =    303.33
Estimated covariances      =        30          R-squared          =    0.9097
                                                               max =        10
Autocorrelation:  panel-specific AR(1)                         avg =        10
Panels:           heteroskedastic (balanced)    Obs per group: min =        10
Time variable:    Year                          Number of groups   =        30
Group variable:   id                            Number of obs      =       300





APPENDIX B  
ORGANIZATION ALIGNMENT OUTCOME: 




                                                                              
        rhos = -.1322145  -.134623  .4441166 -.0815815 -.0760462 ...  .0178586
                                                                              
       _cons     86.14074   7.046674    12.22   0.000     72.32951    99.95196
    WhiteSox    -1.746464   3.825555    -0.46   0.648    -9.244414    5.751486
       Twins     -12.4769   5.073537    -2.46   0.014    -22.42085   -2.532951
      Tigers    -9.268752   6.336837    -1.46   0.144    -21.68872     3.15122
      Royals    -25.71247   4.901345    -5.25   0.000    -35.31893   -16.10601
     Rockies    -17.59339   4.847996    -3.63   0.000    -27.09529   -8.091496
      RedSox    -2.749187    3.07828    -0.89   0.372    -8.782505     3.28413
        Reds    -19.25513   4.858004    -3.96   0.000    -28.77665   -9.733622
        Rays    -16.28286   5.703541    -2.85   0.004    -27.46159   -5.104123
     Rangers    -2.285393   4.061438    -0.56   0.574    -10.24566    5.674878
     Pirates    -24.23495   4.690565    -5.17   0.000    -33.42829   -15.04161
    Phillies    -1.495586    3.61938    -0.41   0.679     -8.58944    5.598268
      Padres    -14.40934   4.885189    -2.95   0.003    -23.98413   -4.834545
     Orioles     -21.7938   4.565994    -4.77   0.000    -30.74298   -12.84462
        Mets    -7.103625   3.713947    -1.91   0.056    -14.38283    .1755775
     Marlins    -13.31761   4.922502    -2.71   0.007    -22.96554   -3.669685
    Mariners     -20.2174   4.922543    -4.11   0.000    -29.86541    -10.5694
     Indians    -15.66892   5.395006    -2.90   0.004    -26.24294   -5.094899
      Giants    -2.992348   4.434292    -0.67   0.500     -11.6834    5.698704
ExposNatio~s    -8.450821   4.955979    -1.71   0.088    -18.16436     1.26272
     Dodgers    -1.476813   3.284009    -0.45   0.653    -7.913353    4.959727
Diamondbacks    -16.64576   4.931184    -3.38   0.001     -26.3107   -6.980813
        Cubs    -6.787823   3.376294    -2.01   0.044    -13.40524   -.1704089
   Cardinals    -13.18587   4.787948    -2.75   0.006    -22.57008   -3.801665
     Brewers     -19.4065   5.133543    -3.78   0.000    -29.46805   -9.344936
      Braves    -.5406078   3.821575    -0.14   0.888    -8.030756    6.949541
    BlueJays    -2.024563   4.266891    -0.47   0.635    -10.38752     6.33839
   Athletics    (dropped)
      Astros    -3.970463   4.189688    -0.95   0.343     -12.1821    4.241174
      Angels      2.91743   3.997217     0.73   0.465    -4.916971    10.75183
SmallMarke~e     11.71069   5.790866     2.02   0.043     .3607996    23.06058
Acquisitio~e    -.5326469   .2374458    -2.24   0.025    -.9980321   -.0672617
Developmen~g     -.054462   .0554951    -0.98   0.326    -.1632304    .0543064
AnnualPlay~r    -.5233373   .1848565    -2.83   0.005    -.8856494   -.1610252
Profession~e     1.014015   .1752621     5.79   0.000      .670507    1.357522
  TeamSalary    -.0328022   .0240694    -1.36   0.173    -.0799773    .0143729
NumberofAl~s      2.90082   .3191344     9.09   0.000     2.275328    3.526312
BuyasPredi~d     -.076305    .921131    -0.08   0.934    -1.881689    1.729078
                                                                              
    TeamWins        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                          Het-corrected
                                                                              
Estimated coefficients     =        37          Prob > chi2        =    0.0000
Estimated autocorrelations =        30          Wald chi2(36)      =    590.32
Estimated covariances      =        30          R-squared          =    0.9151
                                                               max =        10
Autocorrelation:  panel-specific AR(1)                         avg =        10
Panels:           heteroskedastic (balanced)    Obs per group: min =        10
Time variable:    Year                          Number of groups   =        30
Group variable:   id                            Number of obs      =       300






TMGT EFFECT OUTCOME: 
RESULTS FROM STUDY 2 REGRESSION ANALYSIS 
 
 
                                                                              
        rhos = -.1813701 -.2664003  .3973649 -.1150778 -.1044858 ...  .0177524
                                                                              
       _cons      112.786   12.33176     9.15   0.000     88.61616    136.9558
    WhiteSox    -2.793135   3.924818    -0.71   0.477    -10.48564    4.899367
       Twins     10.09578   2.787057     3.62   0.000     4.633249    15.55831
      Tigers    -10.02942   6.268408    -1.60   0.110    -22.31528    2.256432
      Royals    -1.742188    3.06889    -0.57   0.570    -7.757103    4.272726
     Rockies     4.540031   2.714901     1.67   0.094     -.781077    9.861139
      RedSox    -3.760465   3.077672    -1.22   0.222    -9.792591     2.27166
        Reds       4.6106   2.704132     1.71   0.088    -.6894002    9.910601
        Rays     8.220256   4.187534     1.96   0.050       .01284    16.42767
     Rangers    -2.920437    4.07663    -0.72   0.474    -10.91049    5.069611
     Pirates    (dropped)
    Phillies    -1.944067   3.719071    -0.52   0.601    -9.233312    5.345178
      Padres     9.393772   3.172055     2.96   0.003     3.176658    15.61088
     Orioles     2.948846   2.544094     1.16   0.246    -2.037488    7.935179
        Mets    -7.921861   3.713743    -2.13   0.033    -15.20066   -.6430577
     Marlins     11.05445   3.252332     3.40   0.001     4.680001    17.42891
    Mariners     4.601405   3.215745     1.43   0.152     -1.70134    10.90415
     Indians     8.830361   3.602058     2.45   0.014     1.770457    15.89027
      Giants    -3.914006    4.57059    -0.86   0.392     -12.8722    5.044186
ExposNatio~s    -9.617024   4.904014    -1.96   0.050    -19.22871   -.0053325
     Dodgers     -2.31354    3.30896    -0.70   0.484    -8.798982    4.171902
Diamondbacks     7.271408   3.274194     2.22   0.026     .8541054    13.68871
        Cubs    -7.240795   3.391168    -2.14   0.033    -13.88736   -.5942282
   Cardinals      11.0441   2.949568     3.74   0.000     5.263052    16.82515
     Brewers     4.899392   3.626143     1.35   0.177    -2.207719     12.0065
      Braves    -1.815497   3.808575    -0.48   0.634    -9.280167    5.649173
    BlueJays    -2.867194   4.242057    -0.68   0.499    -11.18147    5.447085
   Athletics     24.24626    4.55082     5.33   0.000     15.32682     33.1657
      Astros    -5.142645   4.088161    -1.26   0.208    -13.15529    2.870003
      Angels     .2646272   3.971012     0.07   0.947    -7.518413    8.047667
SmallMarke~e    -13.67265   4.809746    -2.84   0.004    -23.09958   -4.245719
Acquisitio~e    -.3918388   .2452818    -1.60   0.110    -.8725823    .0889047
Developmen~g    -.0412507   .0547465    -0.75   0.451    -.1485518    .0660504
AnnualPlay~r    -.4790998    .184928    -2.59   0.010     -.841552   -.1166476
Profession~e     1.046922   .1859987     5.63   0.000     .6823713    1.411473
  TeamSalary    -.0458154   .0242963    -1.89   0.059    -.0934353    .0018045
NumberofAl~s     2.970544   .3190512     9.31   0.000     2.345215    3.595873
NumberA~ared     .0918218    .038299     2.40   0.017     .0167572    .1668864
NumberA~ired    -3.265106   1.258818    -2.59   0.009    -5.732344   -.7978672
                                                                              
    TeamWins        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                          Het-corrected
                                                                              
Estimated coefficients     =        38          Prob > chi2        =    0.0000
Estimated autocorrelations =        30          Wald chi2(37)      =    609.46
Estimated covariances      =        30          R-squared          =    0.9262
                                                               max =        10
Autocorrelation:  panel-specific AR(1)                         avg =        10
Panels:           heteroskedastic (balanced)    Obs per group: min =        10
Time variable:    Year                          Number of groups   =        30
Group variable:   id                            Number of obs      =       300











                                                                              
        rhos =  .3497463   .758704  .5659591  .6040925  .1852917 ... -.1557328
                                                                              
       _cons      160.397   51.90424     3.09   0.002     58.66653    262.1274
    WhiteSox    -66.72352   39.21789    -1.70   0.089    -143.5892    10.14213
       Twins    -21.52867   18.02536    -1.19   0.232    -56.85773     13.8004
      Tigers    -70.73785   38.53813    -1.84   0.066    -146.2712    4.795497
      Royals     3.497296   15.72062     0.22   0.824    -27.31455    34.30914
     Rockies     17.10113    14.6184     1.17   0.242    -11.55042    45.75267
      RedSox    -42.19828   40.23238    -1.05   0.294    -121.0523    36.65575
        Reds    (dropped)
        Rays      5.94403   15.16806     0.39   0.695    -23.78483    35.67289
     Rangers    -61.28125   43.00721    -1.42   0.154    -145.5738    23.01134
     Pirates     11.45625     15.742     0.73   0.467    -19.39751       42.31
    Phillies     -70.0145   40.23577    -1.74   0.082    -148.8752    8.846153
      Padres     17.56058   15.80112     1.11   0.266    -13.40904    48.53021
     Orioles     11.75821   14.89641     0.79   0.430    -17.43822    40.95465
        Mets    -49.29978   39.35667    -1.25   0.210    -126.4374    27.83787
     Marlins     4.138794   14.85525     0.28   0.781    -24.97695    33.25454
    Mariners     11.65965   15.81731     0.74   0.461     -19.3417    42.66101
     Indians     18.85389   14.65891     1.29   0.198    -9.877055    47.58483
      Giants    -46.08575   39.82552    -1.16   0.247    -124.1423    31.97083
ExposNatio~s    -45.49786   40.74796    -1.12   0.264    -125.3624    34.36667
     Dodgers     -45.2241   43.73551    -1.03   0.301    -130.9441    40.49593
Diamondbacks     8.433449   16.91639     0.50   0.618    -24.72206    41.58896
        Cubs     -37.1075   39.44641    -0.94   0.347    -114.4211    40.20605
   Cardinals     9.749469   17.58728     0.55   0.579    -24.72096     44.2199
     Brewers      6.59832   14.75652     0.45   0.655    -22.32394    35.52058
      Braves    -63.72373   38.86301    -1.64   0.101    -139.8938    12.44638
    BlueJays    -79.36357   42.56065    -1.86   0.062    -162.7809    4.053781
   Athletics    -13.85524   19.14508    -0.72   0.469     -51.3789    23.66842
      Astros    -55.89636   41.14113    -1.36   0.174    -136.5315    24.73877
      Angels     -80.2875   39.32547    -2.04   0.041     -157.364   -3.211001
  NewStadium     21.04293   7.213565     2.92   0.004     6.904604    35.18126
  TeamSalary     1.095005   .0888939    12.32   0.000     .9207763    1.269234
NumberofAl~s     1.347732   1.037717     1.30   0.194    -.6861559    3.381619
SmallMarke~e    -64.17071   41.15054    -1.56   0.119    -144.8243    16.48286
Acquisitio~e    -.4195695   .7416222    -0.57   0.572    -1.873122    1.033983
Developmen~g    -.0616246    .177711    -0.35   0.729    -.4099318    .2866826
AnnualPlay~r     .4374902   .5257448     0.83   0.405    -.5929507    1.467931
Profession~e    -3.074547    .565667    -5.44   0.000    -4.183234    -1.96586
NumberA~ared     .1021392   .1211018     0.84   0.399     -.135216    .3394943
NumberA~ired    -3.431643   3.853885    -0.89   0.373    -10.98512    4.121833
    TeamWins     .4568989   .1457197     3.14   0.002     .1712936    .7425043
                                                                              
     Revenue        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                          Het-corrected
                                                                              
Estimated coefficients     =        40          Prob > chi2        =    0.0000
Estimated autocorrelations =        30          Wald chi2(39)      =    536.77
Estimated covariances      =        30          R-squared          =    0.8415
                                                               max =        10
Autocorrelation:  panel-specific AR(1)                         avg =        10
Panels:           heteroskedastic (balanced)    Obs per group: min =        10
Time variable:    Year                          Number of groups   =        30
Group variable:   id                            Number of obs      =       300





APPENDIX E  
AVERAGE ATTENDANCE OUTCOME: 




                                                                              
        rhos = -.0417998  .4220957  .8090793  .6098928  .6002124 ...  .6039615
                                                                              
       _cons     13819.84   6074.162     2.28   0.023     1914.697    25724.97
    WhiteSox    -9758.984    3923.11    -2.49   0.013    -17448.14   -2069.829
       Twins    (dropped)
      Tigers    -4702.818    2582.17    -1.82   0.069    -9763.779    358.1431
      Royals    -6762.108   3884.242    -1.74   0.082    -14375.08    850.8658
     Rockies     1754.256   3976.858     0.44   0.659    -6040.242    9548.754
      RedSox    -6832.338   2208.195    -3.09   0.002    -11160.32   -2504.355
        Reds    -5658.028   4013.418    -1.41   0.159    -13524.18    2208.127
        Rays     -9283.26   3932.784    -2.36   0.018    -16991.38   -1575.145
     Rangers    -3027.162   2625.782    -1.15   0.249      -8173.6    2119.276
     Pirates    -3747.059   3817.425    -0.98   0.326    -11229.08    3734.958
    Phillies    -412.4397   3065.757    -0.13   0.893    -6421.212    5596.333
      Padres    -854.1412   3975.641    -0.21   0.830    -8646.254    6937.971
     Orioles    -2281.243   4432.945    -0.51   0.607    -10969.66    6407.169
        Mets    -2253.022   4271.723    -0.53   0.598    -10625.44    6119.401
     Marlins    -11035.97   4062.543    -2.72   0.007    -18998.41   -3073.536
    Mariners    -236.7087    4296.52    -0.06   0.956    -8657.733    8184.315
     Indians    -4687.028   3919.378    -1.20   0.232    -12368.87    2994.811
      Giants     3534.196   2377.283     1.49   0.137    -1125.193    8193.584
ExposNatio~s    -8445.873   3855.912    -2.19   0.028    -16003.32   -888.4237
     Dodgers     6217.391   2644.476     2.35   0.019     1034.314    11400.47
Diamondbacks    -492.0489   3800.069    -0.13   0.897    -7940.047     6955.95
        Cubs       1639.1   2364.281     0.69   0.488    -2994.805    6273.006
   Cardinals     3803.791    3960.53     0.96   0.337    -3958.706    11566.29
     Brewers     551.7707   4269.395     0.13   0.897     -7816.09    8919.631
      Braves    -3709.918    2846.13    -1.30   0.192    -9288.231    1868.395
    BlueJays    -6773.118   2915.434    -2.32   0.020    -12487.26   -1058.972
   Athletics    -4592.599   4687.043    -0.98   0.327    -13779.03    4593.837
      Astros     588.5622   2868.775     0.21   0.837    -5034.134    6211.259
      Angels     4539.938   2570.298     1.77   0.077    -497.7532    9577.629
  NewStadium     1354.146   1151.713     1.18   0.240     -903.169    3611.461
  TeamSalary     90.30851   13.48521     6.70   0.000     63.87798     116.739
NumberofAl~s      258.813   129.5778     2.00   0.046     4.845163    512.7809
SmallMarke~e    -1207.272    4484.19    -0.27   0.788    -9996.123    7581.579
Acquisitio~e      447.874   118.1753     3.79   0.000     216.2547    679.4934
Developmen~g    -10.77781   23.95934    -0.45   0.653    -57.73725    36.18164
AnnualPlay~r    -157.0657   71.10744    -2.21   0.027    -296.4337   -17.69766
Profession~e     241.2838   82.75356     2.92   0.004     79.08979    403.4778
NumberA~ared     19.57016    17.2108     1.14   0.256    -14.16239    53.30271
NumberA~ired    -652.1141   553.3112    -1.18   0.239    -1736.584    432.3559
    TeamWins     109.1334   19.96735     5.47   0.000     69.99814    148.2687
                                                                              
AverageAtt~e        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                          Het-corrected
                                                                              
Estimated coefficients     =        40          Prob > chi2        =    0.0000
Estimated autocorrelations =        30          Wald chi2(39)      =   1707.23
Estimated covariances      =        30          R-squared          =    0.9134
                                                               max =        10
Autocorrelation:  panel-specific AR(1)                         avg =        10
Panels:           heteroskedastic (balanced)    Obs per group: min =        10
Time variable:    Year                          Number of groups   =        30
Group variable:   id                            Number of obs      =       300
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